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INTRODUCTION
Early-Warning: The Problem
1"...I think the great failing, to me, of the 
United Nations is in not taking preemptive 
action. It is almost impossible to put 
Humpty-Dumpty together again once he has 
fallen off the wall. Where the UN should do 
more is in keeping him on the wall in the 
first place” . Sir Anthony Parsons, 
Permanent Representative of the United 
Kingdom to the United Nations during the 
Falklands/Malvinas War.l
1 Sir Anthony Parsons, Falkland Islands, Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Fifth Report, Vol. II, Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, 25 October 1984, p. 77.
2
Between 1945 and 1984, 137 international disputes made the 
agenda of the United Nations.2 While many of these disputes 
between member states are long-term and continue today,3 only a 
small fraction escalate into crises and then into open 
conflicts. Many member states possess the military capabilities 
to go to war, yet few possess hostile intent. Capabilities, 
such as the acquisition of a new weapons system, tend to be 
tangible, as the build-up of capabilities takes time and 
therefore can be scrutinized. A nation’s intentions can change 
quickly, however. Intentions can also be ambiguous -- one 
nation’s hostile intent can be used to intimidate (e.g., to 
achieve a better negotiating position); another nation’s hostile 
intent can be used to prepare for war.4 Furthermore, there are 
no clear-cut divisions between the dispute, pre-crisis and 
crisis stages of a potential conflict situation. There are 
similarly no fine divisions between what Betts terms the three 
phases of warning: "political warning" ("...increase in tension 
that raises the possibility that deterrence can fail."),5 
"strategic warning" ("...indications that the enemy is 
mobilizing... in a manner consistent with a plan of attack")6 and 
"tactical warning" ("...the detection of initial movements of 
the attack itself..."). 7
2 Ernst B. Haas, The United Nations and Collective Management of 
International Conflict, United Nations Institute for Training 
and Research (UNITAR), New York, 1986, E .86.X V .ST/19, p. 5.
3 Gerald Hopple, "Intelligence and Warning: Implications and
Lessons of the Falkland Islands War", World Politics, Vol. 36, 
No. 3, April 1984, p. 344. [In Latin America alone, there have 
been 30 long-term bilateral conflicts since 1945, many of which 
are still active.]
4 Lawrence Freedman, "Intelligence Operations in the Falklands", 
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 1, No. 3, September 
1986, pp. 311-312.
5 Richard Betts, Surprise Attack, The Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C., 1982, p. 4.
6 Betts, p . 4.
7 Betts, p . 5.
3The difficult task faced by the United Nations is to 
identify and act upon -- at an early stage -- those disputes 
which "appear” to be set on the path towards conflict. If the 
UN cannot or does not act on warning, and open conflict ensues 
between the two parties in a dispute, the task of resolving the 
conflict arguably becomes more difficult, especially if member 
states are unwilling to utilize the collective security measures 
(e.g., diplomatic sanctions, economic sanctions) provided in the 
UN Charter.
More importantly, the waste in economic, human, and 
political terms is difficult, if impossible, to recover. 
Despite the Organization’s recent successes in conflict 
resolution (e.g., April 1988 Geneva Accords in Afghanistan, 
August 1988 cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War, December 1988 
implementation of the independence plan for Namibia), 
approximately 1.2 million people have died in Afghanistan and 5 
million have become refugees, 1.5 million people have perished 
in the Iran-Iraq War, while 15,000 people have died in Angola 
and 600,000 have been displaced.8
I have structured the sub-thesis, "Acting on Warning: The
United Nations and the Prevention of Conflict,” around two case
studies: the April 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War and the April
1989 Namibian crisis. In Chapter 1, the "warning rationale” of
Britain in the lead-up to the Falklands/Malvinas War is
discussed to provide the perspective of a nation-state in an
early-warning environment. Like its counterparts worldwide, the
national intelligence service of Britain is tasked to assess the
capabilities and intentions of other nations, particularly those
nations which possess the potential to threaten its national
8 Cruz Ro.ja (magazine of the Spanish Red Cross), "Perez de 
Cuellar: El Hombre de Moda", October 1988, p. 10.
4interests. Thus, Britain’s intelligence community is not only 
tasked to (1) collect information which provide clues of another 
nation’s intentions, but it must also (2) assess the hostile 
threat (or lack thereof) in those intentions, and (3) relay the 
warning signals in a "threat assessment" to the proper political 
authorities in time for appropriate policy action.9 These three 
steps of the "warning rationale" -- collection, assessment, and 
timely use of early-warning information -- provide an 
appropriate framework in Chapter 1 to examine the performance of 
British intelligence in the pre-crisis period (the early months 
of 1982) and crisis period (after the 19 March South Georgias 
incident) leading up to the 2 April invasion of the Falkland 
(Malvinas) Islands by Argentina.
In Chapter 2, I apply the framework outlining the warning 
rationale -- collection, assessment, and timely use of early- 
warning information -- in the context of the United Nations. 
Chapter 3 describes the collection, assessment and use of early- 
warning information by the United Nations in the lead-up to the 
April 1982 invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands by 
Argentina. Chapter 4 discusses the early-warning improvements 
in the Organization which have taken place since the 
Falklands/Malvinas War. Chapter 5 outlines the actions of the 
Organization in the lead-up to the April 1989 Namibian crisis. 
The final chapter sets out several conclusions which can be 
drawn regarding the ability of the United Nations to "act on 
warning".
For purposes of clarification, "acting on warning" in the
context of the United Nations is used here to denote the abi1ity
9 The term "warning rationale" is introduced by the author. The 
3 steps of the term are adapted from Arie Ofrie’s "Crisis and 
Opportunity Forecasting", in "Forum: Intelligence and Crisis
Forecasting", ORBIS, Vol. 26, No. 4, Winter 1983, pp. 821-827.
5of the Secretariat of the Organization (e.g., Office of the 
Secretary-General and other political departments) to act on a 
likelihood of potential conflict by (1) verifying the likelihood 
of such a conflict and (2) issuing the warning for the purpose 
of preventing the conflict. The aim of the sub-thesis, while 
acknowledging the complex institutional and political obstacles 
which exist in the context of the United Nations, is to 
determine whether the Secretariat’s focus on early-warning since 
the 1982 South Atlantic War has produced qualitative, 
substantive improvements.
CHAPTER 1
The Argentine Invasion of the Falkland
(Malvinas) Islands: the *Karning Rationale’ of Britain
6I. THE CRISIS: THE SOUTH GEORGIAS INCIDENT
The crisis which lead to the 2 April 1982 invasion of the 
Falkland (Malvinas) Islands by Argentina began on 19 March 1982. 
An Argentine metal-scrapping party landed at Leith, in the South 
Georgia islands, and reportedly raised the Argentine flag. 
[Located about 800 miles southeast of the Falklands, the South 
Georgia islands is a dependency of the Falklands.] British 
sightings of the event prompted a Whitehall protest on 20 March. 
On 23 March, based on an outcry in Parliament (and reversing its 
message to Argentina of 21 March), the British government 
ordered the HMS Endurance to evict the Argentines. On the same 
day, the military junta in Buenos Aires ordered the Bahia 
Paraiso (with 3 landing craft and a military helicopter) to 
defend the metal-scrapping party. By 24 March, the day the 
Bahia Paraiso disembarked Argentine naval personnel at Leith, 90 
Members of Parliament in the House of Commons had presented a 
petition requesting the Government to maintain a sufficient 
surface force to repel an Argentine invasion of the Falkland 
(Malvinas) Islands. On 26 March, following the 25 March reports 
(based on widespread rumors in the British public media) that a 
small British task force was planning to head for Port Stanley, 
the Argentine Junta ordered the invasion of the Falklands.1
On 31 March, two days before the invasion, the Current 
Intelligence Group of the British Foreign Office was still 
reporting in London that there was "...no intelligence 
suggesting that the Argentine Junta had taken the decision to
1 Virginia Gamba, The Falklands/Malvinas War: A Model for 
North-South Crisis Prevention. Allen & Unwin, Inc., Boston, 
1987, pp. 117-126.
invade the Falkland I s l a n d s 2 Yet on the same day, the
British defence attache in Buenos Aires was quoting Argentine 
press reports of air force transports being readied to lift 
troops to the south of Argentina and of a general mobi1ization.3 
How did this lack of consensus in the British intelligence 
community arise?
II. INTRODUCTION
The general focus of the case study is an examination of 
the rationale by which the British government interpreted the 
events which took place in the lead-up to the invasion of the 
Falkland (Malvinas) Islands on 2 April 1982 by the military 
forces of Argentina. In order to understand why certain events 
were not judged by the British to be "warning indicators,” or 
signals of Argentine intent to abandon the status quo of 
bilateral negotiations and invade the islands, it is relevant to 
reconstruct the historical context in which Britain found itself 
in early 1982.
The British government built its warning rationale on a 
foundation of self-deception, components of which included 
distraction, domestic economic and political constraints, and 
cultural misperception. However, it would not be prudent to 
argue that the British response to the events of early 1982 was 
irrational, given that similar reactions have occurred in other 
prolonged disputes. As Betts has documented, sudden attacks 
occur in situations of prolonged tension.4 An understanding of 
the warning rationale of a nation-state in a long-term dispute
2 Lawrence Freedman, "Intelligence Operations in the Falklands",
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 1, No. 3, September
1986, p. 310.
3 Freedman, p. 318.
4 Richard Betts, Surprise Attack, The Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C., 1982, p. 95.
8situation will be useful in subsequent chapters, when the 
warning rationale of the United Nations is examined.
Another issue worthy of discussion here is the relationship 
between political, strategic and tactical warning indicators.
In the lead-up to the South Atlantic War , the British
understanding of the relationship between these signals was
misguided. Although London was aware of what Betts terms
political warning, London attributed the early 1982 tension to 
yet another intimidation campaign by Buenos Aires, not unlike 
the 1977 crisis. Whitehall thus failed to detect what Betts 
terms strategic warning because -- based on past crises 
London relied on one basic strategic assumption. If Argentina 
had decided to invade, it would opt for a gradual escalation 
scenario in the lead-up to the invasion; for instance, by 
severing transport and communication links with the islands, 
before opting to invade. Visible Argentine preparations for war 
in this formula would be interpreted as no more than 
intimidation.5
When the tactical indicators began to reveal Argentina’s 
sudden intent to change the status quo -- via the 19 March 1982 
South Georgia Islands incident -- the benign political and 
strategic indicators were still accepted unti1 the tactical 
indicators could provide unambiguous proof of Argentine plans to 
invade.
III. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION
The key question posed by intelligence task ( 1 ) the
collection of information on the opponent’s intentions -- i s
whether British intelligence assets were adequately deployed to
5 Freedman, p. 314.
9collect warning information. On the surface, there seemed to be 
no lack of intelligence-related information being sent to 
London. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)6 of the Cabinet 
Office in London, responsible for warning the government of 
impending foreign threats, had access to all cable traffic from 
the UK Embassy in Buenos Aires and, in particular, all military 
intelligence from the defence attache there. As a NATO ally, 
Britain also had access to intelligence data gathered by the 
United States government, such as signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
and image (e.g., satellite photo-reconnaissance) intelligence 
(IMINT).7
What happened in early 1982, however, reveals that certain 
gaps in the collection of military indicators by the 
intelligence community led policymakers in London to rely 
heavily on the political indicators. First, there was a lack of 
adequate collection of military intelligence in the pre-crisis 
period leading up to the 19 March South Georgia Islands 
incident. According to the January 1983 Franks Report -- the 
official inquiry into the British government’s responsibi1ities 
in the period leading up to South Atlantic War -- there was no 
coverage of Argentine military movements within Argentina, as 
there were no funds available for the British defence attache to 
investigate military activities in the country’s (widespread) 
bases and ports (e.g., Comodoro Rivadavia, Mar Del Plata, Rio 
Gallegos, Rio Grande).8 Moreover, as no study had been made on
6 The chairman of the JIC is a Deputy Under Secretary of State 
in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).
7 Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic:
Origins of the South Atlantic War", Chapter 5, Psychology and 
Deterrence, Richard Ned Lebow (ed.), Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore, Md., 1985, p. 91.
8 Oswald H. Ganley and Gladys D. Ganley, "Unexpected War in the
Information Age: Communications and Information in the
Falklands Conflict", Program on Information Resources Policy,
10
normal Argentine military activity, the military attache could 
not identify abnormal activity.9
Second, there was a lack of proper political intelligence 
concerning the possible intentions of Argentina in the lead-up 
to the 20 March South Georgias crisis. Despite a June 1981 JIC 
request for more intelligence data on the intentions of 
Argentine policymakers, no extra resources were available from 
Whitehall. To cut costs, the UK had steadily been reducing 
covert activities in South America, with the result that human 
intelligence (HUMINT) sources were scaled down in favor of 
signals intelligence (SIGINT).IO Consequently, when the South 
Georgia crisis erupted, and SIGINT transmissions revealed a more 
hostile Argentine military, such transmissions were masked in 
the JIC assessment because, as there was no justifiable 
distinction between abnormal and normal Argentine military 
activity, the JIC did not want to rely on SIGINT data. SIGINT 
provided the best idea of the Argentine military’s intentions, 
but as it could not be categorized, it was not given as much 
countenance as the traditional (political) strategic
assumptions.11
Third, there was limited third-party collection of
intelligence, as U.S. intelligence assets were not useful until
after hostilities began on 2 April. According to the Franks
Report, no intelligence about the invasion came from US sources
before it took place, from satellite sources or otherwise.12
Center for Information Research, Harvard University, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1984, p. 30.
9 Freedman, p. 314. (As the British defence attache himself 
pointed out (in a March 1982 assessment), no system had been 
established to identify those Argentine military moves which 
would "force the issue."]
10 Ganley and Ganley, p. 29.
11 Freedman, p. 330.
12 Lord Franks, (ed.), Falkland Islands Review: Report of a
Committee of Privy Counsellors, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office,
The US, in fact, learned of the invasion only 48 hours in 
advance, through British rather than American intelligence 
reports.13 While one can assume that there was coverage of 
Argentine ship activities via the "Fleet Ocean Satellite 
Information Center" (FOSIC), both London and Washington were 
aware that Argentina had publicly announced plans to exercise 
with the Uruguayan Navy on 23 March.14
Finally, Britain found itself distracted by other 
international developments in early 1982. The Falkland 
(Malvinas) Islands was reportedly only one of 90 "tinder boxes" 
identified by the Thatcher government during the South Atlantic 
conflict. 15 Whitehall was also in the midst of another battle 
in the EEC budget process and the Foreign Secretary was planning 
an official visit to Israel.16
IV. ASSESSMENT OF HOSTILE INTENT
According to the Franks Report, the last intelligence 
assessment prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee before 
the invasion -- July 1981 -- held that Argentina would favor 
negotiation as long as it perceived London’s "...willingness to 
negotiate genuinely about, and eventually to transfer, 
sovereignty."17 If not, there would be a high risk of 
"resorting to measures...and that it might act swiftly and 
without warning...(M)i1itary action against British shipping or
London, January 1983, p. 91. [There was also no satellite 
photography available on the disposition of Argentine military 
forces. See p. 94]
13 Ganley and Ganley, p. 28.
14 Lebow, p. 90.
15 Ganley and Ganley, p. 100.
16 Gerald W. Hopple, "Intelligence and Warning: Implications
and Lessons of the Falkland Islands War", World Politics, Vol. 
36, No. 3, April 1984, p. 347.
17 Franks, pp. 26-27.
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a full-scale invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands could 
not be discounted."18
Other assessments by the JIG, however, predicted that 
Argentina would choose a ’gradual escalation scenario." 
Accordingly, as the Anglo-Argentine negotiations on the question 
of sovereignty of the islands represented the modus operandi 
between Buenos Aires and London, the Argentine government might 
try to increase its bargaining position by taking diplomatic and 
economic measures (e.g., disruption of food and oil supplies) 
before invading the islands.19 Why did London, in early 1982, 
give credence to the latter "gradual escalation" scenario, 
instead of the "swift, no warning" scenario? Here, it is 
essential to consider the effect of past Argentine-British 
crises on the British assessment psyche.
For London, the series of incidents between 1975 and 1977 
represented a likely escalation scenario by Buenos Aires. In 
December 1975, an Argentine Navy vessel fired a shot at the 
British ship RSS Shackleton.20 In the first weeks of 1976, the 
British embassy in Buenos Aires reported that several Argentine 
newspapers were advocating invasion "in veiled terms."21 In 
December 1976, a British helicopter discovered an Argentine 
military presence on Southern Thule in the South Sandwich 
Islands (dependencies of the Falkland Islands).22 By 1977, 
Argentina had cut off fuel supplies to the Falklands,23 and both 
countries had recalled their ambassadors.24
18 Franks, p . 2 7.
19 Franks, p . 26.
20 Guillermo A. Makin, "Argentine Approaches to the
Falklands/Malvinas: Was the Resort to Violence Foreseeable?",
International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 3, Summer 1983, pp. 392-398.
21 Franks, p. 9.
22 Franks, p . 14.
23 Lebow, p. 101.
24 Makin, pp. 396-397.
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As Betts wrote in Surprise Attack, "...the victim’s 
strategic assumptions trigger the serious miscalculations that 
produce surprise. . . " . 25 The high ranks of the British 
intelligence community in London had developed several strategic 
assumptions about a future crisis instigated by Argentina, based 
on the length of the ongoing dispute, the earlier false alarms, 
and the rhetoric of the Argentine press. Central to these 
assumptions was the belief that Argentina was not genuinely 
dissatisfied with the bilateral negotiations. Factors which 
reinforced these assumptions were self-assuring: General 
Galtieri appeared preoccupied with domestic issues in early 
1982, the bilateral talks at the UN in February 1982 had been 
marked by "cordiality," and Argentina was improving its 
relations with Europe and the USA.26 Discounted by London were 
events such as the 3 March unilateral communique by the 
Argentine Junta, which was attributed to Argentine propaganda 
and bluff, and not to a hardening of the Argentine position.27
After the 2 April invasion, according to author Ned Lebow, 
the Thatcher Government claimed it had been a victim of a "cry- 
wolf" phenomena. It believed it had been desensitized by 
Argentina via a constant campaign of threats, propaganda and 
intimidation. In other words, Whitehall believed that Buenos 
Aires in 1982 was bolstering its negotiating position by bluff 
and intimidation as it had done in 1977.28
25 Hopple, pp. 344-345.
26 Hopple, p. 347.
27 Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Three Hundred 
and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, United Nations Security Council, 
S/PV.2350, 3 April 1982, p. 11. [Argentina said it "...reserves 
the right to put an end to ...(the negotiations)... and freely 
choose the procedure it deems most fit in accordance with its 
interests."]
28 Lebow, p. 107.
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However, 1982 was not like 1977. As Lebow writes, 
"(p)erhaps the most important difference between 1977 and 1982 
was that in the interim Argentine leaders had lost faith in 
negotiations with Britain and had concluded that they would 
never achieve sovereignty over the Falklands by diplomacy."29 
In general, British intelligence leaders arguably held fast to a 
form of psychological denial called "bolstering", in which their 
original strategic assumption (Buenos Aires’ gradual escalation 
scenario) was reinforced in lieu of an alternative assumption.30 
In particular, as the Foreign Office provided key personnel in 
charge of the Joint Intelligence system, more weight was 
attached to the political indicators than the military 
indicators in the lead-up to the Argentine invasion.31
Another example of British self-deception cited by the 
Franks Report was the claim that the intelligence community had 
underestimated the significance of the Argentine press campaign 
of early 1982 compared with past press campaigns advocating a 
military takeover of the islands. The Franks Report made the 
following observation of the Argentine press:
”...(W)e are not sure that at all important 
times the assessments staff were fully aware 
of the weight of the Argentine press 
campaign in 1982. As a result it seems to 
us that they may have attached greater 
significance to the secret intelligence, 
which at that time was reassuring about the 
prospects of an early move to 
confrontation...".32
Although the UK embassy in Buenos Aires informed JIG of the 
views being expressed in the Argentine press, British 
capabilities for propaganda analysis had reportedly declined, as
29 Lebow, p . 95.
30 Lebow, p p . 103-106.
31 Freedman, pp. 312-313.
32 Franks, p. 85.
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the embassy was ..unable to take full advantage of even 
Argentine press coverage of the crisis. "33 For instance, 
according to Guillermo Makin, landmark articles —  many of which 
openly advocating military action -- appeared in Clarin,
Conviccion, La Nacion, La Prensa, and Latin America Weekly 
Report from early January to late March 1982.34
Another component of the British government’s self-
deception in early 1982 was the failure to analyze adequately 
Argentina’s interpretation of British intentions. According to 
the Franks Report, the changes in the position of Argentina were 
"...more evident on the diplomatic front and in the associated 
press campaign than in the intelligence reports."35 To Buenos 
Aires, some of the British moves which signalled a lack of 
commitment to the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands were the British 
Nationality Bill (which excluded the Falkland islanders from an 
automatic right to British citizenship), Britain’s continued 
selling of arms to Argentina, the planned sale of the British 
aircraft carrier HMS Invincible,36 the October 1981 announced 
closing of the British Antarctic Survey base in Grytiviken 
(South Georgia Islands), and the October 1981 elections for the 
Falkland Islands Legislative Council (which voted for a freeze 
of the bilateral talks on the question of sovereignty for 25 
years) .3 7
A critical sign of British recalcitrance on the issue was 
the 1981 Defence White Paper decision to withdraw the HMS 
Endurance from the South Atlantic. [In reaction to the HMS 
Endurance decision, several Argentine newspapers had reprinted
33 Freedman, p. 313.
34 Makin, pp. 399-401.
35 Franks, p. 85.
36 William Wallace, "How Frank Was Franks?", International 
Af fairs, Vol. 59, No. 3, Summer 1983, p. 456.
37 Gamba, pp. 100-102.
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an article in the British Daily Telegraph which asserted that 
the UK was "abandoning the protection of the islands." In a 
late 1981 report, British intelligence suggested that Argentina 
had viewed the withdrawal of the HMS Endurance as a deliberate 
political gesture, instead of the true British motive, economic 
cutbacks.]38 Another important sign of British reticence was 
an Argentine military presence on Southern Thule, which had been 
tolerated from 1977 to 1982, despite the fact that UK had 
privately labeled it a violation of British sovereignty.39
Finally, Whitehall underestimated the extent to which 
British domestic economic and political constraints affected its 
Falkland Islands policy and, most importantly, the extent to 
which Buenos Aires may have interpreted these constraints as a 
change in the status quo (of negotiations leading towards a 
transfer of sovereignty). For instance, sending a "tripwire" 
force to deter the Argentines would have cost money. In late 
1981-early 1982, the British Ministry of Defence was belt­
tightening. The Economist claims that a request from the 
Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington for a naval force any time 
before 29 March (when British intelligence allegedly received 
evidence of the likelihood of an Argentine attack) "would 
probably be laughed out of court."40 On the other hand, if 
London had decided to assuage Argentine intimidation vis-a-vis a 
concession on sovereignty, it would have faced an immediate 
backlash among conservative elements of Fleet Street and 
Pariiament.
38 Thomas Boudreau, "Prevention Lost: The Falklands/Malvinas",
Chapter 10, Watchman of the Peace: The Secretary-General and
the Prevention of International Armed Conflict, Ph.D. 
dissertation, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 
Syracuse University, N.Y., 1985, p. 342.
39 Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend, eds., The Falklands 
War, Allen & Unwin, Inc., Winchester, Mass., 1985, pp. 84-87.
40 Lebow, p. 102.
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V. USE OF WARNING SIGNALS BY BRITISH POLICYMAKERS
This issue involves two questions: (1) whether British 
policymakers received adequate intelligence assessments of the 
situation in the South Atlantic, and if so, (2) whether 
policymakers acted effectively on the basis of intelligence 
assessments. With regard to (1), the JIC assessments received 
by British policymakers did not account for the not-so-benign 
situation "on the ground" which occurred in March 1982. When 
the South Georgias crisis occurred, and the SIGINT intercepts 
revealed less benign Argentine military movements, the SIGINT 
data was discounted in the JIC assessments. As the British 
defence attaches report through ambassadors, and thus through to 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), there was a tendency 
for their raw military intelligence to get lost in a report 
which had been "over-assessed" by the political Foreign Office 
staff. Approximately 90% of the intelligence received by 
ministers of the UK government was in "processed form" -- not 
raw data but the politicized assessments compiled by the JIC.41 
Thus, without a classification of military warning indicators, 
British policymakers interpreted any visible Argentine 
preparations for war as intimidation and thus fell back on their 
strategic escalation scenario.42
With regard to (2) -- whether policymakers acted 
effectively on the warning available in the intelligence reports 
-- according to Lebow there were no strongly worded warnings 
from London to Buenos Aires (even private warnings) until 31 
March, "...when the invasion was all but a fait accompli...".43
41 Ganley and Ganley, p. 26.
42 Freedman, p. 314.
43 Lebow, p. 110.
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As mentioned, the fear of provocation was a key element in 
London’s decision-making. British government policy towards 
Argentina and the Falkland Islands was never formally discussed 
outside the Foreign and Commonwealth Office after January 1981. 
The Defence Committee, a committee of Cabinet, could have been 
held at any time, if necessary at short notice. However, no 
Defence Committee meeting was convened until 1 April 1982, the 
eve of the Argentine invasion. There was no reference to the 
Falklands in Cabinet until Lord Carrington reported on the 
events in South Georgia on 25 March 1982.44
On the other hand, British policymakers believed they had 
few options in responding to Argentina. First, because of the 
distance between Britain and the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, at 
least three weeks of warning time would have been required to 
provide an effective British response.45 Second, the timing of 
the Argentine invasion proves that Argentina was not concerned 
initially with the British response. In early April 1982, much 
of the British fleet was back home for Easter, thereby 
facilitating the rapid assembly of the British Task Force.46 
Third, the actual Junta order for the invasion was given 
late in the day -- 26 March -- and London would have learned of 
the invasion date only if there had been a leak in the Junta 
itself. According to excerpts of the Rattenbach Report -- the 
official Argentine post-war investigation -- a tri-service
44 Franks, p . 79.
45 David E. King, "Intelligence Failures and the Falklands War:
A Reassessment", Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 2, No. 
2, April 1987, p. 339.
46 Ganley and Ganley, p. 27. [If Argentina had waited for only 
two months, the British fleet would have been dispersed (with 
some elements as far away as the Indian Ocean). The Task Force 
would have also taken more time to arrive in the South Atlantic 
two months later -- in the southern hemisphere’s winter. Also, 
Argentina was acquiring new arms -- Exocet missiles and Super- 
Entendard aircraft from France -- and would have been much 
better-equipped a few months later.]
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planning cell was formed in Buenos Aires in January 1982 to set 
up the Falklands invasion, but the earliest planned landing date 
was 9 July 1982. However, when the British press 
sensationalized the South Georgias incident on 21 March, and 90 
Members of Parliament presented a petition in the House of 
Commons on 24 March for a sufficient surface force to repel an 
Argentine invasion in the Falklands (not South Georgia),47 the 
Junta, on 26 March, abruptly brought forward the invasion date 
to the night of 1-2 April.48 Between 26 March and 31 March, the 
benign British political intelligence slowly fell into line with 
the not-so-benign military intelligence reports -- the 
cancelling of all naval leave on 28 March, the deployment of 
almost all the Argentine naval fleet,49 and the breakaway of 5 
Argentine warships from the Uruguayan manoeuvres to the South 
Georgias on 30 March.50
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the crisis culminating in the 2 April 1982 
Argentine invasion essentially began after the 19 March South 
Georgia Islands incident, according to Lawrence Freedman, 
"...there were a number of prior indications that the situation 
was getting critical ...” 51 In effect, the so-called
"intelligence failure" was not due to London’s inability to 
predict the timing of the Argentine invasion (tactical warning), 
but its failure to foresee the 1ike1ihood of the invasion
47 Gamba, pp. 117-126.
48 King, p. 337.
49 Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Three Hundred
and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, United Nations Security Council, 
S/PV.345, 1 April 1982, pp. 8-11.
50 Freedman, p. 317.
51 Freedman, p. 319.
20
(political and strategic warning).52 There were tremendous 
forces of self-deception among British policymakers which 
contributed to the failure to foresee the likelihood of an 
Argentine attack. The bureaucratic rivalry between officials of 
the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence on the Joint 
Intelligence Committee, the denial behavior which high-ranking 
officials of the JIC exhibited, and the cultural misperceptions 
which British policymakers held about their counterparts in 
Buenos Aires (e.g., the decision to withdraw the HMS Endurance) 
represent examples of such a "human failure". The common 
denominator was the belief that Argentina, still interested in 
the bilateral negotiations, was pursuing an intimidation 
strategy via the South Georgias incident to achieve a better 
negotiating position.
It was the South Georgia incident in late March -- the 
crisis period -- which highlighted the flawed relationship 
between the tactical (military) indicators and the strategic 
(political) indicators. As the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands 
dispute had lasted so long without an Argentine invasion, high- 
ranking members of the JIC believed that Argentina, despite its 
bluff and intimidation, would not abandon the negotiations. To 
change its tried-and-true strategic assumption, JIC wanted 
crystal-clear tactical indicators. At the height of the crisis 
period, the problem was not the tactical indicators -- which 
were now less ambiguous -- but the fact that the Foreign Office- 
dominated JIC was still unwi1ling to alter its benign strategic 
rationale.
52 Phil Williams, "Miscalculation, Crisis Management and the 
Falklands Conflict", The World Today, Vol. 39, No. 3, April 
1983, p. 145.
CHAPTER 2
The 'Warning Rationale’ of the United Nations
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I. INTRODUCTION
The general aim of the chapter is to examine the concept of 
warning in the context of the United Nations. The particular 
aims of the chapter are to (1) identify the warning actors in 
the United Nations system, and (2) discuss the degree to which 
institutional and political "realities” in the Organization 
affect the warning actors.
II. FAILURE OF UN COLLECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES
The Charter of the United Nations was signed on 26 June 
1945. According to Article 1 of the Charter, the first purpose 
of the United Nations is "...(t)o maintain international peace 
and security...to take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace...".1 Since the 
end of World War II, however, Article 1 has been consistently 
breached —  approximately 150 armed conflicts have occurred, 
with between 16 and 20 million deaths. 2 Despite the collective 
means available in the UN Charter to prevent or remove threats 
to international peace and security, conflicts have repeatedly 
evolved from disputes between member states.
First, with respect to the removal or resolution of 
conflicts, the architects of Article 1 had envisioned a world in 
which the post-war Allies, utilizing the Security Council and 
the collective security measures (e.g., diplomatic sanctions, 
economic sanctions, military force) within Chapter VII of the 
Charter, would act essentially as the UN’s policeman against
1 Charter of the United Nations, Department of Public 
Information, United Nations, New York, September 1986, DPI/511,
p. 3 .
2 "Conflicts and Militarism", 1985 Report on the World Social
Situation, United Nations, New York, 1985, E/CN.5/1985/2/Rev. 1,
p. 14 .
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other member states which had violated the tenets of the 
Charter. However, with the onset of the Cold War and the 
realignment of the post-war Allies into East and West blocs, 
conflict resolution measures in Chapter VII did not acquire 
legitimacy. Today, if a conflict involves either the five 
permanent member states of the Council or their allies, for 
instance, it is likely that one of the ’Big Five" will veto a 
resolution calling for the removal of the conflict.3 Similarly, 
if there is a lack of consensus in the Council on the presence 
(or lack thereof) of a conflict, Council action may be limited 
or delayed.4 Finally, states parties to a dispute can simply 
refuse to heed the resolution of the Council. Accordingly, any 
assertive UN role to restore the peace may be interpreted as a 
violation of Article 2.7 of the Charter, which prohibits the 
Organization from ’...intervening in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic Jurisdiction of any state...”.5 
Thus, from the outset of a conflict, the Security Council is 
placed on the periphery of events.
Can the Security Council be warned of a potential conflict? 
Institutional and political constraints cast doubt on such a 
likelihood. First, many of the disputes between member states 
are long-term, yet as Betts has documented, most surprise
3 Anthony Parsons, "The Prevention of War", 1nternational 
Relations, Vol. VIII, No. 1, May 1984, p. 14. [It is likely, 
for instance, that the United States would have vetoed any 
mandatory resolution against the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 
1982, while the Soviet Union would have vetoed any mandatory 
resolution against Vietnam for its invasion of Cambodia in 
1978. ]
4 Parsons, p. 15. [In the lead-up to the 2 April invasion of 
the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, the Argentine military junta 
made an assessment of the UN. It concluded that the Security 
Council "...never acted to avoid a confrontation, because of the 
political pressures involved at this level. It acted only after 
a crisis or intervention had taken place. Mechanisms in the 
United Nations moved after a fait accompli, never before..
See Gamba, pp. 136-137.]
5 DPI/511, p. 5.
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attacks occur in long-term situations of prolonged tension.6 
Accordingly, member states would not tend to warn the Security 
Council of a potential conflict if there is a low level of 
hostilities between the two parties to a dispute.
More importantly, while the Security Council can (via 
Article 34) "...investigate any dispute...to determine whether 
the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security...",? a formal, fact-finding mission of the Security 
Council is often regarded as too public, too political.8 
Similarly, a public warning to the Security Council by a member 
state in a dispute arguably invites involvement by the 15 
members of the Council. Open, formal use of the Charter 
registers public positions of the states; subsequently it may be 
too difficult to backtrack from these public positions without 
"losing face".
The Secretary-General also possesses the formal mandate via 
the Charter to provide public warning of a potential conflict. 
Article 99, which according to Cordovez is the only article in 
the Charter that provides the Secretary-General with authority 
and responsibility comparable to member states,9 authorizes the
Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Security
Council "any matter which in his opinion may threaten the
maintenance of international peace and security."10 In the
6 Richard Betts, Surprise Attack, The Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C., 1982, p. 95.
7 DPI/511, p. 19.
8 Nabil Elaraby, "The Office of the Secretary-General and the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security", The United 
Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 
UNITAR, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, pp. 194-196. fSouth 
Africa, for example, refused to allow a Security Council fact­
finding mission in 1961; it did invite the Secretary-General.]
9 Elaraby, p. 187.
10 DPI/511, p. 50.
past, however, formal invocation of Article 99 by the Secretary- 
General risked heightened expectations and the hype of media 
attention, so much so that it was rarely used formally -- in the 
Congo (1960), Cyprus (1974), and Iran (1979). By formally 
invoking Article 99, the Secretary-General in effect focuses the 
world’s attention on the Security Council for action, of which 
there is no guarantee.il
In accordance with his official mandate, the Secretary- 
General is tasked to execute and implement the resolutions of 
the Security Council and General Assembly, working within the 
guidelines of the Charter. In practice, however, the Secretary- 
General has not been restricted by the Charter because he has 
used Article 99 informally. Informal use of Article 99, in the 
words of Cordovez, "...can provide formal authority for informal 
action."12 Such informal actions of the Secretary-General fall 
within a framework of activities commonly known as "good 
offices." The dynamic advantages provided by "good offices" are 
secrecy and trust which the Secretary-General promotes among 
himself and the member states in a dispute. He does not 
intervene as a "mediator," but offers his services as a "good 
officer," and makes "suggestions" to member states in a dispute. 
For instance, although he typically notifies the President of 
the Security Council, the Secretary-General can dispatch special 
representatives on fact-finding missions with the consent or 
invitation of the member states, yet without formal authority 
from the Council.13
11 Elaraby, pp. 187-189.
12 Diego Cordovez, "Strengthening United Nations Diplomacy for
Peace: The Role of the Secretary-General", The United Nations
and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, UNITAR, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, p. 167.
13 Elaraby, p. 200.
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III. THE UN AND THE WARNING CONTEXT: COLLECTION OF INFORMATION
Not unlike member states, the UN Secretariat gathers 
information on developments in the world. Unlike many states, 
which possess their own covert human-, image-, and signals- 
intelligence networks, the Secretariat is obliged to rely on 
information available in the public domain.
Beyond these general limitations, however, the Secretariat 
suffers from intelligence-gathering problems common to many 
member states. For example, in the years prior to the 
Falklands/Malvinas War, British intelligence had categorized 
Argentina in a low priority for intelligence collection.14 
Although there are certain disputes in which the Organization 
can have little effect (e.g., internal disputes because of 
Article 2.7), in theory, it must categorize every dispute as a 
potential spark to interstate conflict and thus a threat the 
maintenance of international peace and security. In the three 
months leading up to the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands invasion by 
Argentina, for example, the Security Council met to discuss the 
situation in the Occupied Arab Territories, the Middle East, 
Nicaragua, and the Falklands/Malvinas. Three of these
situations, in fact, were discussed in the Security Council on 
the same day as the Argentine invasion.15
Given that member states are not likely to sanction a 
covert intelligence capability operated by the Organization 
(e.g., signals intelligence), it is reasonable to state that 
(using Betts’ terminology) the Secretariat will be able to 
collect signals of "political warning" and possibly "strategic
14 Lawrence Freedman, "Intelligence Operations in the 
Falklands", Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 1, No. 3, 
September 1986, p. 312.
15United Nations Security Council, Provisional Agenda 1981-1984, 
Series UNS/AGENDA/2262-2565 (English).
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warning” but not ’tactical warning.” In other words, the 
Secretariat will be able to detect warning of a likelihood of a 
threat to the maintenance of international peace and security 
(in a best-case scenario), but not the time, date and location 
of that threat.
This scenario holds so long as (a) a potential conflict is 
monitored by the international news media,16 and (b) the news 
report of the potential conflict is monitored by the 
Organization. Unfortunately, as many sudden attacks occur in 
situations of prolonged tension,17 the international media tend 
to overlook these stalemates and turn towards new, more exciting 
events.18 In the Iran of the 1970s, according to Philip Robins, 
the American press ’’...contributed significantly to the 
’surprise’ that the (Iranian) revolution presented.”19 In the 
1987 "tanker war" in the Persian Gulf, Britain’s media 
reportedly underestimated the importance of UN Security Council 
Resolution 598 of July 1987, because "...the slow build-up to 
its endorsement was not racy enough to make the UN a big story." 
Instead, Fleet Street focused on the "...swashbuckling nature of 
the conflict in the Gulf...".20 Secondly, news blackouts -- 
prior to or during a military action -- are commonly used by
16 Ann Florini and Nina Tannewald, The Front Lines: the United
Nations’ Role in Preventing and Containing Conflict, The 
Multilateral Project, United Nations Association of the United 
States of America, New York, 1984, p. 13. ["...(M)onitoring of 
the press is gradually being extended, but developments not 
picked up by the global media are still all too likely to escape 
the notice of the Secretariat...".]
17 Betts, p. 95.
18 Parsons, p. 20. [In the summer of 1980 (before the Iraqi 
invasion of Iran in September), the international media’s 
attention was focused on the Teheran hostage crisis, despite the 
fact that border conflicts were occurring between Iran and
Iraq.]
19 Philip Robins, "A Feeling of Disappointment: The British
Press and the Gulf Conflict," International Affairs, Vol. 64,
No. 4, Autumn 1988, p. 597.
20 Robins, p. 597.
member states to stem information flows to the international 
media. Finally, cultural bias among the people reporting 
international news may allow for one nation’s media to downplay 
a threatening event that another nation’s media would find 
threatening. For example, in the three months prior to the 2 
April 1982 Argentine invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) 
Islands, the British media allegedly did not pick up the 
warnings appearing in the Argentine press (advocating a military 
option) until very late in the day. According to Guillermo 
Makin, the British press "...made no analysis which would put 
the 1982 signals coming from Buenos Aires into some 
perspective."21
The Secretariat’s detection capabi1ity cannot be taken for 
granted, however. In the lead-up to the Argentine invasion of 
the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, the British intelligence 
community managed to gauge the intentions of the Argentine 
military (e.g., cancelling of military leaves) via Buenos Aires 
press reports. In the Secretariat, newspaper and news wire 
reports revealing the intentions of member states (e.g. , 
movements of military troops and/or supplies) are made available 
to the Secretary-General on a time-urgent basis. Most 
importantly, whether the international media is sensitized to a 
potential conflict or not, there is still a high probability 
that the Secretary-General will become aware of it via his 
private consultations (e.g., UN permanent representatives, 
foreign ministers, heads of state). One could even argue that 
the Secretary-General possesses the best strategic- and
21 Guillermo A. Makin, "Argentine Approaches to the 
Falklands/Malvinas: Was the Resort to Violence Foreseeable?
International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 3, Summer 1983, p. 399.
28
tactical-level information in the world, provided that the 
information which foreign_leaders deliver is genuine.
IV. THE UN AND THE WARNING CONTEXT: USE OF WARNING INFORMATION
If it takes too long for a member state’s policymakers to 
decide whether the warning issued by their intelligence 
community is correct and unassailable, there is no early warning 
in effect.22 Warning time is therefore useless if it cannot be 
acted upon by policymakers. In the Organization, although the 
Secretary-General may possess the relevant information to issue 
a warning, there is obviously no guarantee that he would 
publicly utilize this capability. It is important to keep in 
mind that the effectiveness of "good offices" is the Secretary- 
General’s impartiality, discretion and trust. The act of a 
public warning may create the publicity bonanza that is 
contradictory to the spirit of the Secretary-General’s "good 
offices." The Secretary-General’s press spokesman touched on 
this point during a daily press briefing at Headquarters:
"...The Secretary-General did not feel 
that it was his business to pass judgment on 
the motives and intentions of the parties in 
disputes. The only way he could be helpful 
in disputes was if both sides trusted him 
and would make use of him...By coming out 
with flamboyant statements condemning the
intentions, motives and actions of one
party, he would obviously lose his
usefulness."(my emphasis)23
Thus, it is difficult to believe that the Secretary-General 
would publicly "call out" one or both parties to a dispute for 
allegedly threatening to violate the maintenance of
22 Arie Ofrie, "Crisis and Opportunity Forecasting", ORBIS, Vol. 
26, No. 4, Winter 1983, p. 827.
23 DPI Press Briefing, Department of Public Information, United 
Nations, 5 February 1982, p. 4.
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international peace and security.24 He may provoke one or more 
of the parties in the dispute and thus negate a future role for 
his office, whether formal or informal.
V. CONCLUSION
To characterize warning as having a "rationale” in the 
context of the United Nations may be a misnomer. No one actor 
is solely responsible for such a rationale. The Organization is 
repeatedly blamed by member states for not being able to prevent 
conflicts, yet it is not the UN but the 159 member states which 
must share the blame. As the Secretary-General has written, 
"...(t)he United Nations is in no way a super-State. The
organization has no sovereignty of its own..."25 Any warning 
"rationale" of the Organization in conflict prevention is 
doubtful as long as member states fail to provide warning (via 
Chapter VI) so that the Organization may settle disputes 
peacef ully.
And the alternative? Chances are that while member states 
will not warn the Security Council of a potential conflict, they 
will demand that the Council remove the conflict once it begins. 
Conflict resolution then becomes more difficult as long as 
member states refuse to use diplomatic sanctions and economic 
sanctions provided in Chapter VII. Even if the Organization 
were able to deploy a wel1-equipped military force within 
Chapter VII to punish violators of the Charter, many member 
states possess the military hardware to repel such a force.26 
In the final analysis, once member states in a conflict suffer
24 Cordovez, p. 172.
25 Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the
Organization, General Assembly, Supplement No. 1 (A/40/1), 4
September 1985, p. 3.
26 Parsons, p. 15.
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casualties, bridges to negotiation are more difficult to cross. 
’’Saving face" is pursued military, not diplomatically.
Even allowing for the political constraints on the 
Organization’s warning "rationale", however, there are still 
considerable institutional constraints. Warning involves a firm 
understanding of the relationship between the collection, 
assessment and use of information. Assessments prepared for the 
Secretary-General, for instance, will not adequately reflect the 
situation "on the ground" in a potential conflict situation if 
the Secretariat has not adequately collected and verified 
information on a (long-term) bilateral dispute between two 
member states.
There is room, however, for the Secretariat to work 
positively within the existing constraints to improve its 
"warning rationale." The nucleus of such dynamism is the 
Secretary-General, who can privately warn the two parties to a 
dispute to use restraint as well as provide suggestions to the 
parties along the lines of his "good offices" practices. 
Crucial to the success of the work of the Secretary-General is a 
timely awareness of the proper "political vacuum" to offer such 
good offices practices. Such a vacuum is possible in the lead- 
up to a crisis, before intense international attention prevents 
the parties to a dispute from backing down for fear of "losing 
face.”
Privately, the Secretary-General can choose the correct 
moment to promote a role for himself. Whether he facilitates 
communication, provides suggestions or acts as an arbiter, the 
Secretary-General must find the correct opportunity to offer his 
services. As Perez de Cuellar concluded, "...I am Secretary- 
General of 157 countries comprising both developed and
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developing countries...1 must therefore be very careful at all 
times to respect the initiatives of Member countries. It is 
only when I see that there is a vacuum that I think the United 
Nations should try to come forward and take the initiative."27
27 Gunnar P. Nielsson, "Mediation under Crisis Management 
Conditions: The United Nations Secretary-General and the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands Crisis, April 1 -- June 14, 1982",
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University 
of Pittsburgh, Pa., December 1988, p. 44.
CHAPTER 3
The Argentine Invasion of the Falkland 
(Malvinas) Islands: the 'Warning Rationale* of the United
Nations
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I. INTRODUCTION
The general aim of the chapter is to examine the "warning 
rationale" of the United Nations in the lead-up to the 2 April 
invasion of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands by the military 
forces of Argentina. For purposes of continuity, the framework 
utilized in Chapter 1 (to describe the intelligence-gathering 
tasks of the British government) is utilized here in Chapter 3 
to describe the information-gathering tasks of the United 
Nations. Along such lines, the UN is responsible for (1) 
collecting information which provides clues of a nation’s 
intentions, (2) assessing the hostile threat (or lack thereof) 
in those intentions, and (3) relaying the warning signals in a 
"threat assessment" to policymakers for appropriate policy 
ac tion.
Following the last round of the bilateral negotiations 
under United Nations auspices on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands 
prior to the conflict -- at UN Headquarters in New York on 26 
and 27 February 1982 -- Argentina and Britain issued a joint 
communique. According to the press release, the meeting 
"...took place in a cordial and positive spirit. The two sides 
reaffirmed their resolve to find a solution to the sovereignty 
dispute and considered in detail an Argentine proposal for 
procedures to make better progress in this sense."1
1 Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the 
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, "Falkland 
Islands (Malvinas): Working paper prex^ared by the Secretariat",
10 August 1982, A/AC.109/712, pp. 3-4.
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Yet in Buenos Aires, the joint communique was not 
published,2 and two days later, on 3 March 1982, the Argentine 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a unilateral communique, 
which it later called a "forewarning" to the British: ” ...(I)f 
there is no response from the British side [to the Argentine 
proposal], Argentina reserves the right to put an end to the 
operation of such a mechanism and freely choose the procedure it 
deems most fit in accordance with its interests."3
The next public acknowledgement of the Falkland (Malvinas) 
Islands at Headquarters in New York occurred on the eve of the 
Argentine invasion. On the morning of 1 April, the Secretary- 
General, "...alarmed by press reports," called the Permanent 
Representatives of Argentina and Britain to Headquarters and 
urged restraint on both sides.4 Before leaving the Secretariat 
in the afternoon of 1 April (on an official trip to Europe 
announced 25 March), the Secretary-General issued a statement 
urging both governments to continue to use diplomatic means to 
resolve the outstanding issues in the dispute.5
In the Security Council, the crisis which had erupted from 
the South Georgias incident hit the 15-member body "like a bolt 
from the blue...".6 On the day of the invasion, the President 
of the Security Council issued a statement calling for restraint 
on both sides.7 The delegate of Canada to the Security Council 
later asked how such an invasion could have taken place when the
2 Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Three Hundred
and Sixty-Sixth Meeting, United Nations Security Council, 
S/PV.2345, 1 April 1982, p. 6.
3 S/PV.2350, 3 April 1982, p. 17.
4 S/PV.2345, 1 April 1982, p. 11.
5 S/PV.2345, 1 April 1982, p. 11.
6 Anthony Parsons, "The Falkland Crisis in the United Nations,
31 March -- 14 June 1982", International Affairs, Vol. 59, No.
2, Spring 1983, p. 169.
7 S/PV.2349, 2 April 1982, p. 6.
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Argentine-UK bilateral negotiations were being conducted in "a 
civilized spirit."8
II. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION
At first view, it is no surprise that a dispute over a 
group of islands with a population of 1,800, situated 
approximately 780 kilometers northeast of Cape Horn,9 could be a 
peripheral issue to member states. According to Parsons, the 
British Permanent Representative to the UN during the crisis, 
"...(Q)uite honestly except for conversations between myself and 
my Argentinian colleague in the previous three years I genuinely 
do not remember the Falklands being mentioned to me once by 
anybody before 1 April 1982... ".10
What may be surprising is that the Anglo-Argentine dispute 
over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands was being "monitored" by 
the Decolonization Committee of the General Assembly (comprised 
of 24 member states), as well as several political departments 
in the Secretariat.il In 1965, on the recommendation of the 
Decolonization Committeel2 made to the General Assembly —
8 S/PV.2362, 23 May 1982, p. 87. [The delegate of Jordan, who 
admitted having become aware of the conflict the night before 
the Argentine invasion, poignantly remarked that "...(s )ilenced 
guns do not mean that potential1y explosive conflicts are not 
still simmering...." (See S/PV.2366, 25 May 1982, p. 21.)]
9 A/AC. 109/712, p. 2.
10 "Falkland Islands", Foreign Affairs Committee, Fifth Report, 
Vol. II, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 25 October 
1984, pp. 69-70.
11 At least four departments -- the Executive Office of the 
Secretary-General (EOSG), Office of the Under-Secretaries- 
General for Special Political Affairs (OSPA), Department of 
Political and Security Council Affairs (PSCA), and the 
Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization 
(PATD) -- may have been monitoring in-house to some degree the 
Argentine-UK dispute.
12 Gunnar P. Nielsson, "Mediation under Crisis Management
Conditions: The United Nations Secretary General and the
Falkland/Malvinas Islands Crisis, April 1 -- June 14, 1982",
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University 
of Pittsburgh, Pa., December 1988, p. 29. [The Decolonization 
Committee, or "Special Committee of 24” , was established to
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Resolution 2065 (XX) -- Argentina and Britain were "invited" to 
enter into negotiations over the islands and were "requested" to 
keep the Decolonization Committee and the Genera] Assembly 
informed.13 Argentina and Britain thus delivered a formal 
procedural report after each of the bilateral discussions on the 
dispute. Yet as Parsons claimed, the Decolonization Committee 
was interested in those territories where "...something was 
happening: if there had been fresh elections in the Turks and
Caicos or the Cayman Islands... But the Falklands was taken on 
the nod. We sent in our information about it every year.... "14 
In the Secretariat, the last working paper prepared by UN 
staff for the General Assembly on the Falkland (Malvinas) 
Islands prior to the April 1982 South Atlantic War was published 
in August 1981.15 Divided into four chapters -- "General," 
"Constitutional and political developments," "Economic
conditions," and "Social and educational conditions” -- the 
working papers were prepared annually by the Secretariat for the 
Decolonization Committee, based on information transmitted to 
the Secretary-General by Great Britain, as well as published 
articles (e.g., Argentine and British press reports).16
The working papers typically contained outdated 
information. In the August 1981 paper, for example, no press 
report was dated later than January 1981. In fact, Britain had
monitor the implementation of the 1960 "Declaration On Granting 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples", General 
Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV).]
13 Nielsson, pp. 29-30.
14 Foreign Affairs Committee, p. 70.
15 "Falkland Islands (Malvinas): Working paper prepared by the
Secretariat", General Assembly, A/AC.109/670, 5 August 1981.
[The Secretariat issued the next working paper on the Falkland 
(Malvinas) Islands on 10 August 1982, A/AC.109/712.]
16 A/AC.109/670, pp . 1-11. [Britain, as an Administering State
of the Non-Self Governing Territory under Article 73 of Chapter 
VII of the U.N. Charter, had been obliged since 1946 to present 
annual reports on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands to the General 
Assembly. See Nielsson, p p . 28-29.]
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delivered its information for the August 1981 report on 22 
October 1980, covering the year 19 7 9. 17 Thus, the formal and 
routine rhetoric of the Anglo-Argentine diplomatic reporting 
process, coupled with the outdated nature of the Secretariat’s 
reporting process, may have effectively desensitized many member 
states to the possibility of a sudden deterioration in relations 
between Argentina and Great Britain.
If member states were not sensitized to the dangerous 
events occurring in the South Atlantic, was the Secretariat 
staff? First of all, no one office in the Secretariat was 
exclusively mandated to monitor the dispute. In 1982, there 
were nine departments in the political sector of the United 
Nations.18 Second, the Secretariat’s capability to collect 
multiple sources of timely information was far from optimal. 
The main sources of up-to-date information in the Secretariat in 
the first three months of 1982 were the daily news bulletins 
produced in the Section for Co-ordination and Political 
Information of the Department of Political and Security Council 
Affairs (PSCA).19 Although the reports did utilize the Reuters 
news wire service, they were considered rudimentary, based 
primarily on American newspapers.20
Third, the United Nations Information Centre (UNIC) in 
Buenos Aires reportedly did not pouch and/or cable copies of the 
bellicose articles coming out of the Buenos Aires press (e.g., 
La Prensa, Clarin, Conviccion) to the Secretariat in the first
17 A/AC.109/670, p. 2.
18 Review of the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial 
Functioning of the United Nations, A/42/234, 23 April 1987, p.
9 .
19 "Evaluation of the News Service of the Department of
Political and Security Council Affairs: Note by the Secretary-
General", A/41/328, 9 May 1986, p. 4.
20 Confidential interview.
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three months of 1982.21 Finally, the "distraction factor" in 
the Secretariat was particularly high in early 1982. The 
Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, was not only new -- 
he had only been in office since January 1982 -- he was (i) 
conducting consultations, (ii) attending meetings of the 
Security Council, and (iii) fulfilling his obligations as head 
of Administration in the Organization. In particular, he was 
occupied with other political issues that were not being 
discussed in the Security Council at the time —  Afghanistan, 
Cyprus, Iran-Iraq and Namibia. Similarly, the Security Council 
was dealing with a large number of issues in the first four 
months of 1982 (e.g., the Occupied Arab Territories, the Middle 
East, Nicaragua, and the Falklands/Malvinas). From 1981 to 
1988, in only one year -- 1986 -- were there more Security 
Council meetings from January to April than in 1982.22
Despite the aforementioned obstacles, however, the 
Secretariat was indeed aware of certain developments in the 
South Atlantic in early 1982. Although it is doubtful that the 
Secretary-General was aware of the articles in the Buenos Aires 
press in early 1982 calling for a military invasion of the 
Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, the head of the Organization
21 Confidential interview. [In early 1982, there was no 
official mandate allowing UN1C Directors to send information on 
peace and security issues to Headquarters. However, several 
UNIC Directors had diplomatic experience and were more aware of 
peace and security issues. These Directors were sending
publicly-available information on such issues to Headquarters.
As of May 1989, copies of such information which had been cabled 
or pouched from UNIC/Buenos Aires to Headquarters in early 1982 
have reportedly been discarded or destroyed at
Archives/Headquarters to make room for later materials. The 
original clippings and related correspondence at UNIC/Buenos 
Aires have also been discarded or destroyed for the same 
purpose.]
22 United Nations Security Council, "Index to Proceedings of the 
Security Council", ST/LIB/SER.B/S.18 (1981), ST/LIB/SER.B/S.19 
(1982), ST/LIB/SER.B/S.20 (1983), ST/LIB/SER.B/S.21 (1984), 
ST/LIB/SER.B/S.22 (1985), ST/LIB/SER.B/S.23 (1986),
ST/LIB/SER.B/S.24 (1987), ST/LIB/SER.B/S.25 (1988).
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reportedly was aware of the 19 March 1982 South Georgias 
crisis. 23 In the international press, the crisis was picked up 
by United Press International (22 March),24 The British 
Broadcasting Corporation (24 March), 25 The Associated Press (24 
March),26 and Reuters (24 March).27 In addition, verbal 
information on the situation in the South Atlantic may have been 
transmitted to the Secretary-General via his private 
consultations with representatives of the member states. 
According to UN documents, at no time prior to April 1 -- the 
day when the Secretary-General requested consultations with the 
Permanent Representatives of Argentina and the UK -- did the 
Secretary-General officially discuss the situation in the South 
Atlantic.28 On 23 March, the Secretary-General met with 
representatives of Argentina and the US, and representatives of 
Argentina and the UK on 25 March and 29 March respectively.29
23 Confidential interview.
24 "Argentines raise flag over British island", United Press 
International, 22 March 1982.
25 "Argentine statement on S. Georgia incident", The British 
Broadcasting Corporation; The Monitoring Report, 24 March 1982.
26 "British Marines Reported On Way to Evict Argentines", The 
Associated Press, 24 March 1982.
27 1982 Reuters, Ltd.; Reuters North European Service. [See 
articles of 24 March through 30 March, many written by Reuters 
correspondent Robert Powell in Buenos Aires.]
28 DPI Press Briefings, Department of Public Information, United 
Nations, January-Apri1 1982.
29 Two days after the end of the 26-27 February 1982 
negotiations in New York -- the last negotiations before the 
conflict -- representatives of both Argentina and Britain met 
with the Secretary-General in separate consultations. On 23 
March, the Secretary-General met with Jeanne Kirkpatrick, 
President of the Security Council for the month of March 1982, 
and Ernesto De La Guardia, Representative of Argentina to the 
Law of the Sea Conference, during separate consultations. On 25 
March, the day that his spokesman announced the Secretary- 
General’s trip to Europe on 1 April 1982, Perez de Cuellar 
received the credentials of the new Permanent Representative of 
Argentina, Mr. Eduardo Roca. On 29 March, the Secretary-General 
met with the UK Permanent Representative, Mr. Anthony Parsons, 
and the following day, he attended a luncheon of the Security 
Council members given by Ms. Kirkpatrick. [DPI Press Briefing,
1 March 1982, pp. 1-2; DPI Press Briefing, 23 March 1982, pp. 1-
2; DPI Press Briefing, 25 March 1982, pp. 2-3; DPI Press
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There is also evidence that the President of the Security 
Council for the month of March was aware of the South Georgias 
crisis.30 This point cannot be overstated, however. Not only 
is it unlikely that the Secretary-General could become aware of 
the intentions of the three-man junta in Buenos Aires, the junta 
itself was more impatient vis-a-vis the Falklands issue than the 
Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which handled the 
sovereignty negotiations under the auspices of the UN).31
III. ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION
Can the Secretariat assess intentions of the member states 
of the Organization; can it authoritatively determine the 
existence of a potential conflict situation? In early 1982, 
during the lead-up to the Falkland/Malvinas conflict, no 
political department in the Secretariat possessed a specific 
mandate to provide early-warning to the Secretary-General. 
Second, no department was exclusively responsible for preparing 
assessments on the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. Third, as there 
was a low degree of information-sharing between departments, the 
information base of each department’s assessment was likely 
different. As some departments may have been privy to 
information in the Secretary-General’s office (e.g., reports of 
consultations between the Secretary-General and representatives
Briefing, 29 March 1982, p. 1; DPI Press Briefing, 30 March 
1982, p. 1.]
30 S/PV.2362, 23 May 1982, pp. 94-95. [Ms. Jeanne Kirkpatrick, 
Permanent Representative of the United States to the UN and 
President of the Security Council in March, reported after the 
invasion that the United States had offered its good offices to 
help find a solution in the South Georgias incident. Ms. 
Kirkpatrick also had bilateral contacts with the members of the 
Council and the Secretary-General (e.g., DPI Press Briefing, 23 
March 1982, p. 3), but the substance of those discussions is not 
known.]
31 Dr. Jeffrey M. Elliot and R. Reginald, Tempest in a Teapot:
The Falkland Islands War, Borgo Press, San Bernadino, Ca., 1983,
p. 50 .
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of Argentina and Great Britain), their assessments of the 
Argentine-UK dispute may have varied from other assessments. 
Finally, as bureaucratic rivalries (e.g., "turf wars") tended to 
preclude information-sharing between the departments, the 
possibility existed that the department "better connected" to 
the Office of the Secretary-General could have had its 
assessment favoured.
IV. USE OF WARNING SIGNALS BY UN POLICYMAKERS
If one examines the use of warning in the UN context, the 
central question is whether policymakers act on the lead-time 
provided by the assessments. Member states carry the first 
responsibility for providing early-warning in the UN context. 
In early 1982, the British government did not transmit 
intelligence information to the Secretariat until the eve of the 
invasion, 1 April, at the first Security Council meeting on the
crisis. It may have deliberately not done so, or it may have
not been in a position to do so.32
The Secretariat likely carries the second responsibility 
for early-warning. Not unlike the British policymakers in the 
JIC, the UN policymakers did not believe that the Anglo-
Argentine dispute was dramatically different in early 1982 than
past years.33 If Argentine actions in early 1982 had been 
perceived as serious to Secretariat staff, it is reasonable to 
argue that the Secretary-General ( 1 ) would not have taken an
32 Lawrence Freedman, "Intelligence Operations in the
Falklands", Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 1, No. 3,
September 1986, p. 316. [The British embassy in Buenos Aires 
did not report the 25 March incident (in which two Argentine 
destroyers broke off the joint Argentine-Uruguayan naval 
manoeuvres and sailed between the Falkland and South Georgias 
islands) to London until 29 March, and then on the basis of 
press reports.]
33 Confidential interview.
official {announced 25 March) trip to Geneva on the eve of the 
Argentine invasion, and (2) would have offered his mediation 
before accepting the U.S. government offer to mediate the crisis 
on 7 April. As it stands, the Secretary-General did not get
officially involved until 2 May, after the U.S. mediation effort 
had failed and one month after the invasion.34
V. CONCLUSION
In the lead-up to the Falklands/Malvinas War, the
Secretariat’s behavior resembled in many ways the behavior of 
Britain. There was a gap in collection and assessment; the 
Secretariat had little idea of the intentions of the military 
junta, because the news articles of the Buenos Aires press, 
(which had been fed deliberately to the Argentine press by the 
Junta)35 were not made available to the Secretariat from the 
UNIC/Buenos Aires.36
Did the Organization properly use the warning which it had 
collected? The UN made a private call for restraint (Secretary- 
General with the Permanent Representatives of Argentina and 
Great Britain) and a public call for restraint (by the President 
of the Security Council). Of course, neither act of warning 
deterred Argentina from invading the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands 
the following day. As the Secretariat staff acknowledged the 
real danger in the South Atlantic at a very late stage -- 31 
March -- there was no lead-time to establish a framework for
34 Parsons, pp. 169-179.
35 Thomas E. Boudreau, Watchman of the Peace: The United
Nations Secretary-General and the Prevention of International 
Armed Conflict, Ph.D. dissertation, Maxwell School of 
Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1985, p.
343 .
36 Confidential interview. [DPI/New York allegedly cabled 
UNIC/Buenos Aires and UNIC/London on the eve of the invasion and 
instructed both offices to be on "alert."]
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decreasing tensions between Argentina and Great Britain. Had 
the Secretary-General been sensitized to the likelihood of a 
dramatic rise in tension in the South Atlantic -- vis-a-vis the 
bellicose articles coming out of Buenos Aires between January 
and March 1982 -- he may have been able to offer an early, 
private role for himself in order to stem the rise of tensions.
While the Secretary-General thus can act on warning by 
taking on such a deterrent role, it may be politically naive to 
believe that in 1982, with Western confidence in the United 
Nations at a low ebb, the British government or any other 
government would have allowed the UN to get involved at an early 
stage in the South Atlantic. But as there was little awareness 
by the member states of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, the 
Organization may have seen fit to take on a greater role. For 
all intents and purposes, the early 1982 Argentine press 
campaign, the South Georgias incident and the overall background 
on the Anglo-Argentine dispute were a mystery to many member 
states.
Furthermore, having decided that there was a likelihood of 
conflict, the UN would have acted (e.g., fact-finding mission) 
in a manner which would not have provoked an "action-reaction” 
phenomenon. While a response by Britain to the likelihood of a
conflict may have been interpreted by Buenos Aires as
threatening, a response by the UN would have aroused less
controversy. There is no assurance that had the UN acted
earlier, the conflict in the South Atlantic would have been
prevented. But with the gift of hindsight, an earlier UN role 
in the South Atlantic was not a high price to pay compared with 
trying to end a conflict which continued one month after the UN 
became officially involved and cost almost 1,000 lives.
CHAPTER 4
Has the Organization’s 'Warning Rationale* 
Improved Since the Falklands/Malvinas War?
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J . INTRODUCTION
The general aim of Chapter 4 is to chart the course of the 
United Nation’s "warning rationale" since the Falklands/Malvinas 
War. The framework first introduced in Chapter 1 is used here 
to describe the information-gathering tasks of the Organization.
Relative to its performance in the lead-up to the 
Falklands/Malvinas War in early 1982, the Organization is better 
sensitized to the demands of warning in 1989. However, several 
areas of concern remain, such as (i) information gaps with 
resy^ect to the collection of information, (ii) absence of 
adequate staffing to assess information, and (iii) lack of a "UN 
presence" in the pre-crisis area to verify the warning issued by 
UN policymakers.
II. THE YEAR OF INITIATIVE: 1982
The year 1982 provided the catalyst for an intense
reexamination of "conflict prevention" in the Organization.
Secretariat officials found themselves possibly overwhelmed by
what the Secretary-General called "...an alarming succession of
international crises as we11 as stalemates on a number of
fundamental international issues...": Afghanistan, Central
America, Cyprus, Lebanon, Kampuchea, the Falklands/Malvinas War,
the Horn of Africa, the Iran-Iraq War, the Occupied Territories,
and Western Sahara.1 These conflicts arguably had a profound
impact on both the member states and their new Secretary-
General. In particular, three sudden crises -- the alternating
offensives and cease-fires by Iraq and Iran in the April-June
period of the Gulf War, the early April invasion of the
1 Javier Perez de Cuellar, "Report on the Work of the 
Organization", UN Chronicle, Vol. XIX, No. 9, October 1982, p.
12 .
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Falklands/Malvinas, and the early June Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon2 —  alarmed both the Secretary-General and the member 
states.
As a result of these shocks, the Secretary-General 
engineered substantive improvements in the collection of 
information. In July 1982, one month after the end of the 
Falklands/Malvinas War, the "Secretary-General’s Information 
Briefing Books" was established. These books, delivered to the 
Secretary-General every Friday for his weekend reading, 
consisted of summaries of international newspapers, periodicals, 
news wire services and reports from the UNICs, organized along 
UN-oriented issues and related political questions.3 In 
September 1982, a watershed in the "early-warning" rationale of 
the Organization occurred when the Secretary-General made the 
following unprecedented call in his first Report on the Work of 
the Organization:
"In order to avoid the Security Council 
becoming involved too late in critical 
situations, it may well be that the 
Secretary-General should play a more 
forthright role in bringing potentially 
dangerous situations to the attention of the 
Council within the general f ramework of 
Article 99 of the Charter...I wonder if the 
time has not come for a more systematic 
approach...In order to carry out effectively 
the preventive role foreseen for the
Secretary-General under Article 99, I intend
to develop a wider and more systematic
capacity for fact-finding in potential
conflict areas. ..".(my emphasis)!
2 Ulf Jonas Bjork, "Excitement, Tinged with Jingoism: British
Public Opinion and the Falklands in Four News Magazine", paper 
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Education 
in Journalism and Mass Communication, Memphis, TN, 3-6 August
1985, p. 4.
3 Confidential interview.
4 UN Chronicle, p. 13.
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As a direct consequence of the Secretary-General’s Report on the 
Work of the Organization, the News Service of the Department of 
Political and Security Council Affairs (PSCA) was expanded, 
providing for more coverage of non-US newspapers and non-US wire 
services.5 Another important by-product of the 1982 Annual 
Report was the mid-1983 directive by the Under-Secretary-General 
for the Department of Public Information (DPI) requesting the 
United Nations Information Centres (UNICs) to pouch to 
Headquarters publicly-available articles dealing with peace and 
security issues on a weekly basis, and also cables for "fast­
breaking events".6 Even though the reports were "...by strict 
mandate, based solely on information already in the public 
domain and are generally accompanied by abundant press
clippings...”? they sparked much controversy among member 
states. Since their establishment by the the General Assembly 
in 1946, the UNICs had disseminated information about the United 
Nations, not collected information on behalf of the 
Organization.8 After the landmark 1983 decision, some member 
states expressed fear that the UNICs in their capitals would be 
intelligence-gathering sites.
Also a result of the Secretary-General’s 1982 Report on the 
Work of the Organization, as well as the recommendations of the 
1986 "High-level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the
Efficiency of the Administrative and Einancial Functioning of
5 "Evaluation of the News Service of the Department of Political
and Security Council Affairs: Note by the Secretary-General",
A/41/328, 9 May 1986, pp. 12, 19.
6 A/41/328, p. 14.
7 A/41/328, p. 14.
8 "Measures to Strengthen the Capacity and Enhance the Role of
the United Nations Information Centres: Report of the
Secretary-General", General Assembly, A/AC.198/45, 4 May 1982, 
p. 2. [In 1946, the General Assembly had established the UNICs 
"...to ensure that the peoples in all parts of the world receive 
as full information as possible about the United Nations."]
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the United Nations," the Office for Research and the Collection 
of Information (ORCI) was established within the Office of the 
Secretary-General (OSG) in March 1987.9 The Secretary-General 
announced that ORCI was created "...to take full advantage of 
the Secretariat’s capacity to identify threats to peace at an 
early stage...".10 One of the broad functions of ORCI, as 
defined in its organizational mandate, is to "...provide early 
warning of developing situations requiring the Secretary- 
General’s attention...".11
The reexamination of the UN’s role in conflict prevention 
was not a campaign waged solely by the Secretary-General. In 
the General Assembly, member states requested the "Special 
Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the 
Strengthening of the Role of the Organization" (Resolution 
38/141 of 19 December 1983) to examine the area of "...the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace and of situations 
which might lead to international friction or give rise to a 
dispute."12 Member states also have submitted several proposals 
in the General Assembly under the programmes "Peaceful 
Settlement of Disputes between States" and "Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security."13 ORCI was established, in 
fact, because member states had called for the Organization to
9 "The Office For Research and the Collection of Information", 
Organization Manual, ST/SGB/Organization, Section: ORCI, 3 
October 1988, p. 1.
10 Review of the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial 
Functioning of the United Nations, General Assembly, 23 April 
1987, A/42/234, p. 9.
11 ST/SGB/Organization, Section: ORCI, 3 October 1988, p. 1.
12 Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United
Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the 
Organization, General Assembly, Official Records: Forty-first
Session, Supplement No. 33 (A/41/33), 1986, p. 16.
13 A/AC.132/L.47 (Romania), A/AC.182/L.38/Rev.2, (Belgium, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand and 
Spain), and A/AC.182/L.48 (Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic 
Republic and Poland).
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..deal in a timely and urgent manner with potential or actual 
threats to the pace or with acute humanitarian situations..." 14
III. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION
In quantitative terms, there is little doubt that the 
inputs in the timely collection of information have been 
improved in the Secretariat. Examples of these improvements 
include the seven news wire service teleprinters,15 
approximately 12 domestic and foreign newspapers (either same 
day or previous day)16 and the summary of local broadcasts and 
newspaper clippings from the United Nations Information Centres 
(UNICs) . 17 Technically speaking, if an event is reported in 
print in any of the 159 member states, it could be made 
available to the Office of the Secretary General (OSG) the 
following day. The event could be reported by (1) major Western 
newspapers, (2) news wire services, and/or (3) local newspapers.
There are collection problems, however. Given the 
budgetary constraints imposed by the General Assembly for the 
1990-91 budget, ORCI is responsible for delivering more 
programmes with less personnel.18 This shortage of staffing is 
particularly acute in the two Data Units -- Africa k Asia and 
Americas k Europe. Six professional officers in these units are
14 Proposed Revisions to the Medium-Term Plan For The Period 
1984-1989 (extended to 1991), Economic and Social Council, 
Committee for Programme and Co-Ordination, 2 June 1988,
E/AC.51/1988/L.3/Add.17, p. 6.
15 News wire service teleprinters -- AFP (France), DPA (FRG), 
REUTERS (UK), TANJUG (Yugoslavia), TASS (USSR), UPI (US), and 
XINHUA (PRC) -- are located in ORCI. Other news service 
agencies, such as EFE (Spain), operate offices in the 
Secretariat building.
16 Christian Science Monitor, Financial Times, Guardian, 
Independent, International Herald Tribune, Jerusalem Post, Le 
Figaro, Le Monde, New York Times, Times of London, Wall Street 
Journal, and Washington Post.
17 Phillip Corwin, "A year old, ORCI on its feet", Secretariat
News, April-May 1988, p p . 7, 10.
18 Confidential interview.
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theoretically responsible for providing "global coverage" 
monitoring and analyzing developments in over 159 countries as 
well as studying regional and bilateral relations. Similarly, 
radio broadcasts published in either the British Broadcasting 
Corporation’s "Summary of World Broadcasts" or the Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) are made available to ORCI, 
although not in a timely fashion. 19 Third, that a "fast­
breaking" locally-reported event in Country X could be made 
known to the Office of the Secretary-General in a timely fashion 
also assumes that the text of the event is cabled to
Headquarters in New York by one of the 67 UNICs.20 [Of the 67 
UNICs, over 20 also possess facsimile capabi1ities.21] Finally, 
there is no ability to gather information in ORCI if land-line 
communications -- which facilitate the transmission of cables, 
facsimile, and telephone conversation -- are destroyed either in 
natural or man-made disasters.
19 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts are made available in ORCI 
within three to five days of publication. FBIS reports are made 
available from five to seven days of publication.
20 (This assumes that UNIC directors possess the ability to 
identify threatening events reported in the local press and 
cable the text of these reports to Headquarters, instead of 
pouching the reports. In 1983, one article actually predicted 
an event, but as it had been pouched by the UNIC to Headquarters 
(in lieu of being cabled), by the time the pouch reached 
Headquarters, the event had already taken place.]
21 In the field, facsimile machines are located at United 
Nations Information Centres (UNICs) in Athens, Bangkok,
Belgrade, Bogota, Buenos Aires, Copenhagen, Geneva, Jakarta, 
Lima, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Manila, Mexico City, Paris, Rio, 
Rome, Sydney, Tokyo, Vienna, and Washington. Other UNICs share 
space with the offices of the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) Resident Representatives, many of which possess facsimile 
machines. At Headquarters, facsimile machines are located in 
the Department of Public Information (Office of the Press 
Spokesman of the Secretary-General), the Office of the 
Secretary-General, and the Communications Service.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION
Today, ORCI has replaced five political departments in the 
Secretariat.22 Analysis of information has been improved in 
ORCI because (1) the collection of information -- the basis of 
every assessment -- has been centralized in one office, and (2) 
the terms of reference of the assessments are better defined, 
because the Office of the Secretary-General provides specific 
direction. Dr. James Jonah, director of ORCI, provides insight 
on the latter point:
"...You see, you may have had some 
person doing some research -- say, on the 
Gulf or on the Middle East -- but not being 
part of the Secretary-General’s Office, they 
may not be aware of the factors that may 
influence the kinds of conclusions that they 
draw. On the other hand, you many have 
somebody in the Secretary-General’s Office 
who is privy to these statements and 
confidential comments but has not been 
involved in the research. So you bring 
these two together to get a richer 
output.”23
Yet problems still exist vis-a-vis the output of information -- 
the assessments —  produced by the professional officers. 
First, there are few opportunities for the officers in ORCI to 
conduct in-depth studies of countries and identify those trends 
(e.g., "worst-case" scenarios) which could lead to a potential 
conflict situation. Tasked to monitor so many countries, the 
officers of the Data Units spend the majority of their time 
collating information instead of analyzing it.24
More importantly, despite the mandate of ORCI to provide 
"...early warning of developing situations requiring the
22 "A U.N. Office Looks To Prevent Wars", The New York Times, 16 
April 1989, p. 11.
23 "U.N. Veteran Takes on New Role," Interdependent, Vol. 13,
No. 4, August-September 1987, p. 6.
24 Confidential interview.
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Secretary-General’s attention. . .” , 25 to date there is no 
institutionalized process whereby a professional officer in ORCI 
may pass a warning through the head of the office to the Office 
of the Secretary-General (OSG). Even if the professional 
officers are encouraged by OSG to "cry wolf," there is a high 
likelihood that the Secretary-General will not read the 
assessment himself. As the Secretary-General’s daily schedule 
is filled with administrative, diplomatic and political 
commitments, his advisers (e.g., Chef de Cabinet) will determine 
which assessment is relevant for his attention and which is not.
V. USE OF WARNING SIGNALS BY UN POLICYMAKERS
Following the framework developed in previous chapters, the 
use of warning in the UN context involves two questions: (1) 
whether the Organization receives adequate warning assessments, 
and if so, (2) whether UN policymakers act effectively on the 
lead-time provided by the assessments. With regard to (1), 
although there are fewer political departments in the 
Organization, the possibility still exists that one department’s 
assessment will be favored over another department. Although 
"turf wars" have declined, they still exist.
With respect to (2), some would argue that an early "UN 
presence", in the form of a fact-finding mission, could 
effectively take advantage of lead-time, decrease information 
gaps and act as a form of deterrent on behalf of the 
Organization. The 1ikelihood of a threat to the maintenance of 
international peace and security -- the pre-crisis period —  
should represent the critical period for the United Nations to 
act on warning, while time exists to prevent the threat from
25 ST/SGB/Organization, Section: ORCI, p. 4.
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becoming a violation of the maintenance of international peace 
and security.
In a March 1989 working paper submitted to the General 
Assembly, five Western member states proposed that the 
Secretary-General "should be encouraged to undertake fact­
finding missions in areas where in his opinion a dangerous 
situation may arise or exists, in order to collect as much 
relevant information as possible for his own use...".26 Needed, 
of course, is lead-time to position the fact-finding mission. 
Given proper lead-time before the Falklands/Malvinas War, the 
Secretary-General may have seen fit to dispatch a fact-finding 
team -- including UN military staff -- to either the South 
Georgias area or the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands within the 
mandate of Article 99. The downfall of past fact-finding
missions, however, is the fact that many have had little if any 
deterrent effect; typically, a crisis or a conflict has already 
occurred when a mission is organized, and the Organization wants 
to know more about the "on the ground" situation. As Boudreau 
phrases it, such missions are "...an exercise in 'conflict 
control,’ not conflict prevention."27
Another way by which the Secretary-General may gain lead- 
time is to be warned of potential conflict situations by member 
states. In the past, member states have offered to transmit 
private information to the Organization, provided that there
26 "Fact-finding by the United Nations to assist in the
maintenance of international peace and security: Working paper
submitted by Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,
New Zealand and Spain", General Assembly, A/AC.182/L.60, 16
March 1989, p. 2. See also A/AC.121/36, 21 March 1989, and 
A/AC.121/36/Add.1, 4 April 1989.
27 Thomas E. Boudreau, Watchman of the Peace: The United
Nations Secretary-General and the Prevention of International 
Armed Conflict, Ph.D. dissertation, Maxwell School of 
Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1985, p. 
190.
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were "strings attached" (e.g., that the UN would share the final 
product of its information-gathering). The Secretariat refused 
to cooperate, and to date, relies to a substantial degree on 
various Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as Amnesty 
International to verify information provided by governments.28 
In the future, several "pro-UN" member states, such as Canada 
and Sweden, could agree to routinely transmit intelligence 
information to the Secretary-General. In the short-term, the 
Secretary-General’s fact-finding caj^abi 1 i t i es would be upgraded; 
in the long-term, such an "intelligence initiative" could be 
normalized via some form of cooperative arrangement among the UN 
Permanent Missions in New York City. Another option is for the 
Organization to request various non-governmental organizations 
(e.g., SIPRI) to monitor certain intelligence-related tasks 
(e.g., arms transfers).
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the 1982 South Atlantic War, the Organization has 
made dramatic improvements vis-a-vis the collection and analysis 
of warning-related information. More news services and 
newspapers are monitored; an office has been created 
specifically to deal with "early-warning" for the Secretary- 
General; information is being verified as never before.
Beyond these quantitative improvements, however, there are 
qualitative needs which must be addressed. In trying to come to 
grips with too much information, Secretariat staff must sift the 
priority information from the trivial information ("noise"). 
Thus, the Organization must verify information which member 
states pass onto it -- without provoking accusations of working
28 Confidential interview.
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"behind the back" of other member states -- and it must possess 
enough lead-time to issue a private warning. Several 
"verification options" exist for the Organization. Currently, 
with the low-cost, high-return benefits provided by the 
facsimile machine, the UN can act as a "clearing house" for 
information sent from member states, NGOs, and UNICs. In the 
future, it is hoped that all member states will routinely fax 
the UN such information. If normalized, such a process should 
encourage fewer charges of political bias by the Organization. 
Member states will not likely charge the UN with political bias 
when the UN receives information from many actors.
Finally, the Organization could develop a UN-operated 
verification capability. As argued in Chapter 2, given the 
particular needs of the Secretary-General and the Security 
Council for verifiable evidence of a threat to the maintenance 
of international peace and security, the crucial test is for the 
Organization to be able to check the allegations of one 
government against another "on the ground" in the pre-crisis 
area. The early deployment of a fact-finding team has been 
cited as one UN-operated option. The feasibility of using 
reconnaissance assets -- both airborne and satellite -- will be 
discussed in Chapter 5 as another means whereby the Organization
can secure verification.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Has the warning rationale of the United Nations improved 
since the Falklands/Malvinas War? The general aim of the 
chapter is to identify the warning-related problems encountered 
by the Organization in the lead-up to the 31 March 1989 
incursions by over 1,200 armed guerrillas of the South West 
Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) into northern Namibia.
The particular aim of the chapter is to ask whether the 
Organization could have solved these problems. As the 
Organ ization arguably suffered f rom an inf or mat ion gap ''on the 
ground" in the lead-up to the Namibian crisis, for instance, it 
is useful to examine whether airborne and/or satellite 
reconnaissance may have enabled the UN to act on warning.
II. COLLECTION OF INFORMATION
In the months prior to the 31 March 1989 incursions by 
SWAPO, some would argue that the Organization possessed 
political warning.1 Roughly between mid-February and mid-March, 
on at least nine occasions,2 South African newspaper reports, 
radio broadcasts, and government press releases had specifically 
cited a build-up of SWAPO fighters below the 16th parallel 
(approximately 200 kilometers north of the Angolan-Namibian 
border), in violation of the Protocol of Geneva, signed by
1 Richard Betts, Surprise Attack, The Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C., 1982, p. 4. [Political warning is defined as
an "...increase in tension that raises the possibility that 
deterrence can fail."]
2 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 17 February 1989 - 4 April 1989. [For example, see 
"SADF, UN Sharing RSA Military Bases," 15 March 1989, p. 23; 
"Commentary Welcomes SWAPO’s Peaceful Intent," 10 March 1989, p. 
13; "Discussions 'Cleared the Air’," 27 February 1989, p. 6;
"Van Heerden Assesses Progress of Luanda Talks," 24 February 
1989, p. 3; "'Substantive Meeting’ on Angola, Namibia Planned," 
22 February 1989, p. 8; "SWAPO Presence May Affect Namibian 
Elections," 17 February 1989, p. 8.]
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Angola, Cuba and South Africa on 8 August 1988. [According to 
clause 5 of the Protocol, "...Angola and Cuba shall use their 
good offices so that, once the total withdrawal of South African 
troops is completed, and within the context also of the 
cessation of hostilities in Namibia, SWAPO’s forces will be 
deployed to the north of the 16th parallel...".]3
Similarly, the UN possessed what Betts terms strategic 
warning.4 Some weeks before the SWAPO incursions, Pretoria made 
public complaints that SWAPO guerrillas were massing near the 
Angolan-Namibian border.5 Finally, the UN received tactical 
warning.6 Hours before the fighting began on Friday night, 31 
March, South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha showed UN 
Special Representative Marti Ahtisaari and United Nations 
Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) military commander Gen. Prem 
Chand a map in Windhoek, pointing to sites where SWAPO forces 
were grouping near the border.7
3 "Letter dated 4 April 1989 from the Permanent Representative 
of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General", Security Council, S/20566, 4 April 1989, p. 
2 .
4 Betts, p. 4. [Strategic warning is defined as "...indications 
that the enemy is mobilizing... in a manner consistent with a 
plan of attack."]
5 David Zucchino, "For the U.N., failure in Namibia", The 
Philadelphia Inquirer, 19 April 1989. The South African army 
says it provided a detailed briefing of SWAPO activities to 
UNTAG’s military commander, Gen. Prem Chand, but got no 
response. [A day after the border incursions, SWAPO claimed 
that it had invited Gen. Chand on 22 March "to discuss all the 
necessary steps of troop demobilisation and confinement to 
bases." That discussion, according to SWAPO, never took place. 
See FBIS, Sub-Saharan Africa, "SWAPO On Incursion, Cease-Fire,”
4 April 1989, p. 15]
6 Betts, p. 4. [Tactical warning is defined as "...the detection 
of initial movements of the attack itself."]
7 Roger Thurow, "South Africa Wins a Diplomatic Coup Fighting 
Guerrillas With U.N. Blessing", The Wall Street Journal, 5 April 
1989, p. A10. [According to Foreign Minister Pik Botha, "...we 
showed Gen. Prem Chand a map and told him it did not matter what 
they [the UN] told us, there was a danger that that very night, 
or the next day, SWAPO could cross the border." See "Pik Botha 
Discusses SWAPO Incursion", FBIS, Sub-Saharan Africa, 4 April 
1989, p. 23.]
56
If the Organization had collected political, strategic and 
tactical warning signals, then why did it not use the warning? 
In line with the argument developed in previous chapters, this 
question would depend on two sub-issues: (1) whether the 
Secretary-General possessed adequate assessments of the warnings 
of Pretoria, and, if so, (2) whether the Secretary-General acted 
effectively based on the lead-time provided by the assessments.
III. ASSESSMENT OF HOSTILE INTENT
In the run-up to the Falk lands/Maivinas War, the British 
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) policymakers found themselves 
torn between the ’benign" political assessments from the Foreign 
Office personnel and the not-so-benign military assessments from 
the UK embassy staff in Buenos Aires. Similarly, in the lead-up 
to the 1 April incursions by SWAPO in northern Namibia, the 
Secretary-General deliberated between several different 
assessments submitted by various UN departments. On one hand, 
for instance, he was aware of the danger posed by SWAPO bases 
below the 16th parallel, because the Office of Research and the 
Collection of Information (0RC1) had reportedly been providing 
the Secretary-General with oral and written briefings on the 
border situation since December 1988.8 On the other hand, the 
Secretary-General reportedly was receiving assessments by his 
Special Representative (Mr. Ahtisaari), and in particular, the 
UNTAG military force commander (Gen. Prem Chand), which labeled 
the warnings of Pretoria as exaggerated and alarmist.9
The other major dilemma faced by the Secretary-General was 
the confusion surrounding the diplomatic agreements which the UN 
was honoring -- the UN protocols (e.g., Security Council
8 Confidential interview.
9 Confidential interview.
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Resolution 435)10 and/or the non-UN protocols (e.g., Geneva 
Protocol). After 1 April, for instance, the UN claimed it had 
’’no official knowledge" of the Geneva Protocol, and thereby no 
knowledge that Angola and Cuba were responsible for ensuring 
that SWAPO forces were to be deployed north of the 16th 
parallel, 185 miles north of the Angolan-Namibian border.11 
Before the SWAPO incursions, however, the UN likely was aware of 
the issue of the 16th parallel. Notwithstanding the assessments 
provided by ORCI to the Office of the Secretary-General, the UN 
was represented (by the head of peacekeeping operations) as an 
observer —  along with the US and USSR —  at meetings of a 
"Joint Commission" in late February and late March 1989. [As 
parties to the Protocol of Brazzaville, which created the Joint 
Commission in December 1988, Angola, Cuba and South Africa 
possessed the mandate to "...facilitate the proper resolution of 
any dispute regarding the interpretation or implementation..."12 
of the Brazzaville agreement.13] Indeed, roughly one month 
after the 31 March incursions by SWAPO, approximately 4,000 
SWAPO guerrillas had moved north of the 16th parallel as they
10 The Security Council called for [in Sec.Res. 435 (1978)] the 
estab1ishment of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group 
(UNTAG) for a period of up to 12 months to "ensure the early 
independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under 
the supervision and control of the United Nations."
11 Alexander Cockburn, "U.N., Press Bear Taint of Namibian 
Deaths", The Wall Street Journal, 13 April 1989, p. A23. [The 
text of the Geneva Protocol was not published until after the 
SWAPO incursions -- 4 April 1989 - when South Africa submitted 
the full text as a document of the Security Council. See 
S/20566, pp. 1-3.]
12 "Note verbale dated 14 December 1988 from the Charge
d ’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the United States of 
America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary- 
General", Security Council, S/20325, 14 December 1988, p. 4.
13 S/20325, p. 2. [Angola, Cuba and South Africa had agreed in 
the Brazzaville Protocol of 13 December 1988 to recommend to the 
Secretary-General that 1 April 1989 be established as the date 
for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435
( 1978) . ]
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had been required to do under the Geneva Protocol.14 In the 
interim, 316 Namibian deaths, 27 South African deathslS and a 
serious blow to the Namibian independence process took place.
IV. USE OF WARNING SIGNALS BY UN POLICYMAKERS
Did the Secretary-General act effectively on the available 
warning? Faced with two different assessments, the Secretary- 
General allegedly came down in favor of "the people on the 
ground" -- Gen. Prem Chand and the advance personnel of UNTAG, 
who had arrived in Windhoek on 26 February. In hindsight, this 
decision appears paradoxical, because although the UN had been 
in touch with the Angolan government concerning SWAPO bases, 
advance personnel of UNTAG reportedly did not tour southern 
Angola. 16 On 6 March, Gen. Prem Chand, who had just returned 
from a fact-finding trip to northern Namibia, described the 
situation in northern Namibia at a press conference as 
"normal".17
In defense of the Secretary-General, however, why should 
Perez de Cuellar have beiieved the warning signals supplied by 
Pretoria? Although South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha 
stated (in a press release from the Permanent Mission of South 
Africa to the UN) he would take up the issue of SWAPO forces 
below the 16th parallel with the UN Secretary-General,18 sources
14 William Claiborne, "Delegates Convene on Namibian Peace 
Plan", The Washington Post, 28 April 1989, p. A32.
15 Christopher S. Wren, "Pretoria’s Forces Halt Pursuit of 
Namibian Rebels", The New York Times, 14 May 1989, p. 5.
16 "UN’s Prem Chand Addresses News Conference", FBIS, Sub- 
Saharan Africa, 10 March 1989, p. 25.
17 "Racist agents tell lies to UN personnel -- trade unions",
The Herald (Zimbabwe), 10 March 1989.
18 ["On the issue of SWAPO’s presence south of the 16th 
parallel, Mr. Botha said he would take up the matter directly 
with United Nations Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar...". See 
"Discussions 'Cleared the Air’," FBIS, Sub-Saharan Africa, 27 
February 1989, p. 7.] This appeared in a Johannesburg Television 
Service broadcast on 25 February, and was also reported in "News
59
in the Secretariat claimed that no warnings were verbally 
transmitted by the South Africans. 19 Second, both Angola and 
South Africa were the sources of a good bit of "noise" in early 
1982, as each nation had accused the other of violating 
multilateral agreements.20 Third, countless false accusations 
of Angolan and SWAPO improprieties by the government-controlled 
media in South Africa may have caused any news emanating from 
Pretoria to be discounted in the Secretariat.21 Reinforcing 
this "cry-wolf” rationalization was the irrationality of a SWAPO 
incursion from southern Angola into northern Namibia. Why would 
SWAPO, which had been funded and heavily supported by the UN, 
invade Namibia and contravene a UN-brokered agreement (Security 
Council Res. 435)?
Thus, the issue was complex; there were signals warning in 
favor of an incursion by SWAPO elements and against such an 
incursion. Additionally, the perception of the Secretariat 
officials in early 1989 was a factor to consider in the 
equation. In early 1982, the British intelligence community 
discounted the possibility that Argentina would invade the 
Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, whatever the (military) warning 
signals. Similarly, in early 1982 the UN wanted the Namibian
Highlights from the South African Media," 1 March 1989 (7/89), 
The Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations.
19 Confidential interview.
20 Charges and counter-charges between Angola and South Africa 
transpired in the lead-up to the 1 April incursions. Luanda 
blamed South Africa for backing UNITA forces in attacks on the 
FPLA in southern Angola, while Pretoria claimed that SWAPO was 
maintaining bases south of the 16th parallel. [See 
"'Substantive Meeting’ on Angola, Namibia Planned", FBIS, Sub- 
Saharan Africa, 22 February 1989, p. 8. ] On 19 July 1989, South 
African territorial administrator Louis Peinaar had warned that 
1,900 SWAPO guerrillas were about to enter Angola. However, 
UNTAG visited the border area and reportedly found no evidence 
to support the allegation. [See Allister Sparks, "Tensions Rise 
in Namibia Over Troop Deployments", The Washington Post, 20 July 
1989.]
21 Confidential interview.
independence timetable to stay on track, whatever the ’’warnings" 
from Pretoria. Not maintaining the course might have realized 
the worst outcome for the Organization: UNTAG withdrawing, 
South Africa re-invading Angola, and Cuba redeploying its troops 
in Angola.
With regard to Item (2) -- whether the Secretary-General 
acted effectively based on the lead-time provided by the 
warnings -- to believe that the UN should have been sensitized 
to the likelihood of a SWAPO infiltration is one thing; to 
believe that the UN could have actively prevented the conflict 
between SWAPO and South African forces on the border is quite 
another. As mentioned, not the UN but Angola and Cuba were 
officially sanctioned to ensure that SWAPO forces would be 
deployed above the 16th parallel by 1 April. [On 17 February, 
however, Pretoria claimed publicly that the Angolan and Cuban 
components of the Joint Commission had refused to permit 
inspection visits to the region (southern Angola).22 And in 
late March, Luanda admitted that it was unable to guarantee that 
SWAPO troops would be confined to their bases north of the 16th 
parallel.23]
Even had the Organization itself acted on the lead-time 
which it had arguably possessed since mid-February, it is 
doubtful that UNTAG could have militarily prevented the SWAPO 
incursions (e.g., by forming a buffer between SWAPO and the 
South African military forces) in northern Namibia. Although 
UNTAG was responsible in Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) 
to "...keep the borders under surveillance and prevent
22 "SWAPO Presence May Affect Namibian Elections", Johannesburg 
SARA, 17 February 1989 in FBIS, Sub-Saharan Africa, 17 February 
1989, p. 8.
23 "Obligations of SWAPO", The Times of London, 6 April 1989, p. 
15.
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infiltration,” UNTAG’s Gen. Prem Chand did not concentrate on 
such a task, principally because his troop strength had been cut 
severely by the Security Council in February 1989.24 Not only 
was the UNTAG force decreased in February from the original
7.500 personnel (as mandated by the Security Council Resolution 
435 of 1978) to 4,650,25 there were only 921 troops in Namibia 
on 1 April, and they were "...busy monitoring the withdrawal of 
the South African Defence Force (SADF) and watching the 
disbanding of the local South West Africa Territory Force... ".26 
Most importantly, the approximately 1000-mile Angolan-Namibian 
border was difficult, if not impossible, to monitor even with
7.500 men.27 Even the approximately 100 troops which UNTAG had 
deployed in the north of Namibia on 1 April were monitoring the 
South Africans, not the border.28
24 "Further Report of the Secretary-General Concerning the
Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 435 (1978) and 
439 (1978) Concerning the Question of Namibia", Security 
Council, S/20412, 23 January 1989, pp. 14-15. The original
mandate of the military component of UNTAG, as approved in 
Security Council resolution 435 (1978), included task Item (f):
"To keep the borders under surveillance and prevent 
infiltration." This item was apparently omitted in the 
Secretary-General’s 23 January 1989 recommendation to the 
Security Council (S/20412) concerning the implementation of 435 
(1978). However, in an explanatory statement (S/20457) 
concerning S/20412 of 9 February 1989, the Secretary-General 
remarked: "Paragraph 54 (a) of my report specifies only the
tasks on which it is envisaged that the Force Commander would 
concentrate. No tasks have been eliminated."
25 "Security Council Adopts Resolution Authorizing
Implementation of its Independence Plan For Namibia", Security 
Council/2848th Meeting, SC/5074, 16 February 1989, p. 1.
26 Richard Dowden, "Peace in the balance", The Independent, 4 
April 1989, p . 19.
27 [According to South African media reports, SWAPO 
infiltrations appeared to have taken place between Eenhana, 
about 30 kilometers east of Oshikango, to the Ruacana areas some 
250 kilometers to the west. See FBIS, Sub-Saharan Africa, 4 
April 1989, p. 26.]
28 John Carlin and Richard Dowden, "UN blamed for Namibia 
battle", The Independent, 4 April 1989, p. 1.
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Finally, in the event of violations, there was no clear 
mechanism for contacting SWAPO at the battlefield level. 29
If anything can be gained by the UN’s performance in the 
lead-up to the 31 March incursions, it is that the critical 
ingredients to the Organization’s "warning rationale" are (a) 
the need for a UN-operated "on the ground" capability to verify 
warning-related information, (b) lead-time to act on the 
warning, and (c) the ability to effectively communicate with all 
parties in the (possible) conflict. Angola and Cuba did not 
possess either the facilities or the political will to monitor 
SWAPO to base. Had the Organization possessed a capability to 
monitor SWAPO in mid-February -- the "pre-crisis” period -- it 
is reasonable to argue that the UN would have possessed enough 
lead-time to deter SWAPO without putting the independence 
timetable in jeopardy. The next question debated here is 
whether satellite and/or airborne reconnaissance could provide 
the Organization with "on the ground" information.
V. SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE
Consider the following scenario of mid-February 1989 -- the 
"pre-crisis” period -- in Namibia: In response to the public 
warnings issued by Pretoria of the presence of SWAPO guerrillas 
below the 16th parallel, the Secretary-General, acting under the 
provisions of Article 99 (and/or the authority conferred on him
29 Carlin and Dowden, p. 1. [Many SWAPO battlefield military 
commanders had no radios (See Dowden, "Swapo leader ordered 
incursion, envoys say", The Independent, 5 April 1989, p. 1.); 
South Africa also as a practice jammed SWAPO radio frequencies. 
[While the UN should have been able to contact SWAPO 
headquarters in Luanda, SWAPO itself could not communicate with 
its guerrillas in the field.” See John Carlin, "Security forces 
pour into border zone as fighting subsides", The Independent, 5 
April 1989, p . 12.]
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by the Security Council under Article 34)30 requests that the 
Organization acquire optical images of the areas below the 16th 
parallel in southern Angola.
Setting aside the possible political problems in this 
scenario, is it feasible to use satellites in crisis-monitoring 
today? In the 1983 UN study entitled "The Implications of 
Establishing an International Satellite Monitoring Agency" 
(ISMA), a UN Group of Experts concluded that international 
crisis-monitoring, such as the surveillance of border violations 
or preparations for aggression, was technically feasible.31
Clearly, military reconnaissance satellites operated by the 
US and USSR meet the demands outlined by the Group of Experts -- 
and those of the Secretary-General according to the scenario. 
However, as these programs are covert or "black",32 it is almost
30 Charter of the United Nations, Department of Public
Information, United Nations, New York, September 1986, DPI/511.
Article 99 reads as follows: "The Secretary-General may bring
to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his 
opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and 
security." (p. 50) Article 34 reads as follows: "The Security
Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which 
might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, 
in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or 
situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security." (p. 19)
31 "The Implications of Establishing an International Satellite
Monitoring Agency: Report of the Secretary-General", Department
of Disarmament Affairs, New York, 1983, E.83.IX.3, p. 67. [The 
Group concluded that satellite coverage of the "pre-crisis" 
period would be necessary once in every five to seven days, 
while a higher coverage frequency (possibly 2-3 times a day) may 
be appropriate in the crisis period. (See p. 29)]
32 Torleiv Orhaug, "Technology Requirements for a Satellite 
Monitoring Agency Focused on Europe", in Satellites for Arms 
Control and Crisis Monitoring, Bhupendra Jasani and Toshibomi 
Sakata, eds. , SIPRI, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1987, 
p. 94. [To date, neither superpower has officially admitted to 
this type of activity, but there is evidence (e.g., the orbital 
inclination of a satellite) that the US and/or USSR have 
monitored the Sino-Soviet border conflict (1969), the Indo- 
Pakistani crisis (1971), the Arab-Israeli War (1973), the Cyprus 
crisis (1974), and others.]
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certain that the superpowers will not supply the images or the 
collateral image-interpretation to the Secretary-General.33
Today, the only space-based alternative to military 
satellites -- civilian remote sensing satellites —  could not 
meet the demands of the Secretary-General either. Civilian 
satellites, in fact, face the same problems delivering timely 
imagery to the international news media today as they would 
delivering imagery to the Secretary-General. In its landmark
study, Commercia I___ Newsgathering From Space:_____A Technical
Memorandum (May 1987), the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA) found that the American EOSAT (the private US company 
which operates 2 LANDSAT satellites) and the French SPOT 
("Satellite Pour 1 ’Observation de la Terre", a Belgian-French- 
Swedish consortium) "...lack the high resolution, timely 
delivery, and assured access to data that some media experts 
feel could make satellite imagery an integral part of the news­
gathering process. . . " . 34 The OTA report, however, cited the 
following key requirements for a satellite appropriate for the 
international media: 5-meter or less spatial resolution, 
sensors operating in at least three spectral bands, frequent
33 On 13 May 1989, The Washington Post reported that President 
Bush had proposed to revive former President Eisenhour's "Open 
Skies" proposal. Bush offered to involve allies from both power 
blocs in a program of mutual unarmed airborne surveillance 
flights -- complemented by satellites -- to provide 
"unprecedented territorial access for both sides." On 17 May, 
the Post reported that the Soviet Union had rejected Bush’s 
proposal, saying it was "...‘senseless’ in an era of satellite 
surveillance and mutual on-the-ground arms inspections." [In 
Namibia, it is believed that the US provided satellite image 
intelligence to South Africa and the USSR provided satellite 
image intelligence to Angola, but only after the 1 April 
incursions.]
34 Commercial Newsgathering From Space: A Technical Memorandum,
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), Congress of the United 
States, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., May 
1987, p. 2.
revisits (1-2 days), and quick delivery time to the media (24 
hours or less).35
First, with respect to ground resolution, neither EOSAT 3G 
nor SPOT 37 can provide the ground resolution necessary for 
crisis-monitoring. Second, the image-collecting sensor on both 
LANDSAT and SPOT is susceptible to atmospheric disturbances.38 
Third, with regard to revisit capability, civilian remote 
sensing satellites lack manoeuvrabi1ity as their orbits are 
fixed. If the crisis were to occur near the Equator, for 
instance, SPOT could target the same area 7 times during the 26 
days of its normal orbital cycle -- an average revisit of 3.7 
days.39 By contrast, each LANDSAT satellite crosses any 
particular longitude at the Equator only once every 16 days.40
Fourth, quick delivery time or "turnaround time" -- the 
time elapsed between the buyer’s request for a ground image and 
the delivery of the image —  may take as much as two weeks for
35 OTA, p. 40.
36 OTA, p. 39. [The latest LANDSAT "Thematic Mapper" (TM) 
satellite is capable of providing images of 30 meters (98 feet) 
over a ground track of 115 miles wide.]
37 John Tirman, "International Monitoring For Peace", Issues in 
Science and Technology, Vol. IV, No. 4, Summer 1988, p. 56.
[SPOT currently provides a 10-meter-resolution photo -- about 33 
feet —  for black-and-white or "panchromatic" imagery of any 
desired area, 60 miles square.]
38 "Expansion of the Network of SPOT Satellite Direct Receiving 
Stations", Press Release, SPOT IMAGE, September 1988, p. 1. 
[Although SPOT’s two main receiving Earth stations (Toulouse, 
France and Kiruna, Sweden) have received and stored more than 
530,000 60x60 kilometer images (by July 1988), only 20% of these 
images are usable. Better said, only 20% of the collected 
images contained less than 10% cloud cover.]
39 "Images a la carte", SPOT IMAGE, 1987, p. 3. [SPOT’s side­
looking "off-nadir" sensors enable it to target larger areas 
(allowing scene centers to be targeted anywhere within a 950 
kilometer wide strip centered on the satellite track), thereby 
improving the satellite’s revisit capability. Also, the 
satellite is able to revisit quicker at higher latitudes. If a 
crisis were to occur northward near latitude 45, the same area 
could be targeted 11 times in a cycle, an average of 2.4 days.]
40 OTA, p. 39. [Because LANDSAT 4 and 5 are days apart in their 
orbiting cycles, they can provide coverage at least every eight 
days.]
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civilian remote sensing satellites such as LAN'DSAT and SPOT. 41 
Neither the satellites’ sensors nor the business structures of 
the civilian remote sensing companies were designed to produce 
imagery on a time-urgent basis.42
Delays are possible when, for instance, a commercial client 
requests imagery which has been collected by a foreign ground 
receiving station. Both EOSAT and SPOT rely on foreign ground 
stations to collect data when the satellite is unable to 
transmit imagery to Earth stations in the United States and 
France. Theoretically, foreign ground receiving stations are 
supposed to provide nondiscriminatory access to all customers.
In practice, however, ground stations have been known to refuse 
to sell data, delay the shipment of data, or deny that the data 
ever existed.43
Furthermore, as crisis-monitoring demands frequent revisits 
by the satellite, the parent satellite company may have to 
postpone or discontinue other (more profitable) commercial 
orders for images, something it may not be willing to do. 44 
Some critics allege that the data interpretation of the civilian 
satellite-collected images could be found wanting. Without the
41 Laurie McGinlev, "Satellites May Give Journalists Powerful 
Tool, Lead to Showdown on National Security Issue", The Wall 
Street Journal, 2 July 1986, p. 50.
42 OTA, p. 10. fin August and October 1988, for example, the 
"Commercial Observation Satellite Project” tried to place orders 
with SPOT for military exercises requiring prenotification under 
the 1986 Stockholm Accords. On five occasions, SPOT could not 
fill the order because it was not properly positioned "...within 
the narrow time frames of interest...". SPOT could not obtain 
suitable ground tracks at particular times. See Michael Krepon, 
"Spying From Space", Foreign Policy, No. 75, Summer 1989, p.
104 . ]
43 OTA, p. 22. ["...(C )ertain countries were notorious for
refusing to release data. For example,...it was very difficult 
to purchase data from India, particularly if they contained 
scenes of the India/Pakistan border."]
44 Theoretically, a potential aggressor could order multiple 
images in one geographic region from SPOT, and then conduct a 
military operation in another geographic region.
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covert intelligence information which is used together with 
images collected by military satellites, the data interpretation 
for civilian remote sensing satellites may be poor.45
Finally, even if the civilian satellite technology exists 
to provide adequate resolution, revisit capability and timely 
delivery of imagery, the possibility still exists that the 
imagery would be unreliable. Not unlike the military
satellites, the civilian remote sensing satellites can still be 
deceived, or "spoofed".46 As their orbits are fixed, civilian 
remote sensing satellites are particularly vulnerable to 
spoofing. Consequently, there is the chance that military 
personnel in the target image area would be aware of both the 
ground track and the overflight time of the satellite. They 
could either elect to postpone their military activities during 
the overflight of SPOT, or they could camouflage these 
ac tivities.
Of course, the debate on the use of satellites in crisis- 
monitoring is in constant flux because of the multiplier effects 
of new technology. With regard to ground resolution, for 
instance, civilian satellite ground resolution is rapidly 
approaching the scale of military satellite ground resolution. 
As the third and fourth SPOT satellites are due to be launched 
in the 1990s, for instance, SPOT’s resolution is projected to be 
5 meters (about 16 feet).47 Similarly, radar sensors which
45 William M. Arkin, "Long on Data, Short on intelligence",
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 43, No. 5, June 1987, p.
5. [SPOT images of the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing site in 
the USSR, for instance, were so obscure that they could not 
demonstrate that the Soviets were prepared to restart their 
nuclear testing program (as the analysis had led many to
beiieve ) . ]
46 William E . Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National
Security, Random House, New York, 1986, p. 338.
47 Ann M. Florini, "The Opening Skies: Third-Party Imaging
Satellites and U.S. Security", International Security, Vol. 13, 
No. 2, Fall 1988, p. 102. One to 10-meter resolution is
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image ground targets through clouds (e.g., "synthetic aperture 
radar", or SAR) and infrared sensors which can detect movements 
at night48 may decrease the limitations of civilian remote 
sensing sate11ites.49 With respect to "turnaround time," 
competition to achieve the best delivery time could be keen in 
the near future. By the close of this century, a number of 
nations, including Brazil, Canada, the European Space Agency 
(ESA), France, India, Japan, and West Germany "...either will 
have developed or will be in the process of developing 
increasingly sophisticated remote-sensing satel1ites."50
VI. AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE
Today, airborne reconnaissance for monitoring purposes 
could meet the demands of the Secretary-General. Aircraft could 
have been deployed at airfields in either northern Namibia 
(e.g., Ruacana, Rundu) or southern Angola, either in the pre­
crisis period or the crisis period.
generally recognized as providing military reconnaissance. fin 
the future, as SPOT is said to be a precursor to the French 
government’s military satellite program, "Helios", the 1-meter 
resolution of Helios may be also included on later SPOT 
satellites. See Thomas E. Cremins and David Reibel,
"Crossroads: Enhanced Space Cooperation?...or Space Weapons0",
Space1ine, Institute for Security and Cooperation in Outer Space 
(ISCOS), Spring 1988, pp. 3-4.]
48 K. Santhaman, "Use of Satellites in Crisis Monitoring", Outer 
Space —  A New Dimension of the Arms Race, Bhupendra Jasani,
ed. , Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Taylor &. 
Francis Ltd., London, 1982, pp. 266-268.
49 Florini, p. 115. [Canada, for example, is planning to deploy 
a SAR-based "RADARSAT" to provide 7-meter all-weather imagery, 
and by the late 1990’s, this imagery could be as good as 1 
meter.]
50 Robert J. Mrazek, "Rethinking National and Global Security: 
And the Role of Space-Based Observations" (original text of 
article in May 1989 edition of Space Policy). [In July 1987, 
the Soviet Union announced that it would sell images of any non­
socialist country with a resolution of 5 meters. Turnaround 
time vis-a-vis the Soviet civilian remote sensing program 
"Soyuzkarta", however, is still in months.j
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In contrast to satellites, reconnaissance aircraft can 
revisit a ground target as many times as necessary, and can 
circle around a target for hours. 51 In terms of ground 
resolution, reconnaissance aircraft not only can be equipped 
with (1) optical sensors with military-capable ground resolution 
(even as low as below 1 meter), and (2) all-weather/day-night 
sensors, but are also less susceptible to atmospheric 
disturbances because they can manoeuvre in and out of clouds. 
In terms of "turnaround time," images collected by aircraft can 
be transmitted in real-time to a ground receiving station. Most 
importantly, airborne reconnaissance costs a fraction of a 
satellite system, particularly when a satellite must be deployed 
continually over a crisis area.52
Aircraft reconnaissance for monitoring and verification 
purposes is not new; since the 1986 Stockholm Agreement on 
Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in 
Europe, unarmed aircraft or helicopters —  without photo­
reconnaissance equipment; only visual, "eyes-only" equipment —  
have been used to visually inspect large-scale troop 
manoeuvres.53 Furthermore, there are new technological 
developments in the field of airborne reconnaissance, such as 
the introduction of unmanned air vehicles (UAVs).54
51 Joe Clark, "Don’t Dismiss Open Skies”, The New York Times, 5 
June 1989, p. A17. [If a satellite fails, it may take years to 
replace it; reconnaissance aircraft can be replaced at a 
relatively rapid rate.]
52 Burrows, pp. 153-154.
53 "CDE Delegations Reach Accord on Military Activities in
Europe", Department of State bulletin: The Official Record of
United States Foreign Policy, Vol. 86, No. 2116, November 1986, 
p. 24. [Helicopters were reportedly used by the United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF II), 1973-79 in the Sinai Peninsula.]
54 Bernard Edinger, "Israel to Unveil Remote-Guided Aircraft for
Peace and War", Reuters , 15 May 1989. [Israel is promoting the
"Impact" UAV which can fly at a maximum altitude of 19,000 feet, 
remain airborne up to 12 hours, and transmit television pictures 
fdav or night) in 1 time to controllers up to 90 miles away.]
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VII. CONCLUSION
This chapter has addressed two questions: (1) whether the 
UN possessed an adequate understanding of the "on the ground” 
situation in southern Angola, and (2) whether satellite- and 
airborne-reconnaissance could have improved such an 
understanding. With regard to Item (1), it would be too easy to 
conclude that there was a "human failure” in the assessment of 
warning; that the Secretary-General reportedly gave credence to 
the assessment provided by "the people on the ground” instead of 
a political department in the Secretariat. There were confusing 
signals as to whether the South African warnings were reliable 
or simply "noise." For all intents and purposes, though, UNTAG 
apparently had little idea of the developments occurring north 
of the Angolan-Namibian border. Having received published 
"warnings" from Pretoria since mid-February 1989 that SWAPO 
might indeed infiltrate Namibia, the UN could have reassessed 
its benign warning rationale if it had attempted to verify the 
warnings provided by the ORCI assessments on the ground.
Had the Organization been able to monitor -- in the pre- 
crisis period of mid-February to mid-March -- the presence of 
SWAPO elements below the 16th parallel in southern Angola which 
could enter Namibia on short-notice, it may have been in the 
position to act on the warning time. Such action could have 
taken the form of a private UN warning to SWAPO regarding the 
dangers of a unilateral push south of the border.
Could satellite and airborne reconnaissance have provided 
the Secretary-General with the capability to verify the warnings 
by South Africa? With respect to ground resolution, in a "best- 
outcome" operational framework, SPOT could currently detect
large groups of personnel (according to South Africa, there were
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approximately 4,000 SWAPO guerrillas in at least four base 
camps) in southern Angola but not identify and describe these 
large groups.55 More importantly, however, SPOT-acquired images 
arguably would have arrived too late to the Secretary-General in 
the crisis period of late March 1989 unless the satellite’s 
ground track happened to be positioned in the area of southern 
Angola.56 For UN policymakers, the key juncture to request 
image orders in the Namibian case was the pre-crisis period -- 
between mid-February and early March. Such images may have 
acted as a "trigger mechanism" to alert the Secretary-General, 
the Security Council and/or member states to evidence of a 
build-up of SWAPO forces in southern Angola below the 16th 
parallel.
If the technical problems in this scenario can be 
addressed, what about the political problems? As the 1967 Outer 
Space Treaty effectively legitimized satellite travel over any 
nation’s territory, there is no prior consent to overfly foreign 
soil.57 However, in the "real world" member states would likely 
deny the UN permission to overfly satellites or aircraft over 
their national boundaries. Despite the de facto universal "Open 
Skies" policy which exists today (e.g., satellites), it is
55 E.83.IX.3, p. 30. [The ISMA report stated that crisis 
monitoring would require satellites with ground resolution of 1 
meter or less. Ground targets which would best approximate the 
deployments of SWAPO -- troop units or bivouacs -- could be 
detected at 6 meters, recognized at 2.1 meters, identified at 
1.2 meters and described at 0.30 meters.]
56 As there are only a handful of staff members in the UN 
Secretariat with image-interpretation experience -- and only 
natural resource image-interpretation, not strategic 
reconnaissance image-interpretation -- the Secretary-General 
today would have to rely on the commercial satellite companies 
to provide image-interpretation. Turnaround time could 
therefore be longer.
57 Florini, p. 119. [The Security Council could legally request 
ISMA services for the monitoring of a particular crisis 
situation pursuant to its investigative powers under Article 34 
of the Charter. See E.83.IX.3, p. 67]
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difficult imagining the Secretary-General going ahead with a UN 
reconnaissance operation if denied. The other major area of 
doubt is financial: (a) whether the UN could attract financing 
from member states to deploy a UN-operated capability, and (b) 
what strings would be attached (e.g., identifying the end-users 
of ground images) if member states were to contribute the 
hardware.
However, if member states are genuinely interested in UN- 
monitored agreements, the Secretary-General could request 
permission to deploy the least controversial means of 
reconnaissance, such as "eyes only” aerial reconnaissance (e.g., 
Stockholm Accords), to gain mutual trust between member states 
and the Organization. Such an initiative could routinize the 
process of aerial reconnaissance to the point that image­
acquiring aircraft and satellites could be practicable in the 
future.
CONCLUSION:
Early-Warning in the UN Context.: To Deter is to Prevent
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In the lead-up to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland 
(Malvinas) Islands, the Secretariat’s "warning rationale" was 
for all intents and purposes ad hoc. Its information collection 
system lacked timeliness as well as a wide range of sources. No 
coherent regime existed for the verification of incoming 
information. Too many political departments submitted 
assessments, each office with its own turf and each with its own 
connections to the Office of the Secretary-General.
Today, how much has changed? Since the Falklands/Malvinas 
War, quantitative improvements have indeed been made. Facsimile 
machines have been added; news wire teleprinters have been 
installed. There is no assurance, however, that the 
Secretariat’s ability to "act on warning" will be credible as 
long as substantive, qualitative improvements are not put into 
place. And even if such improvements are forthcoming, the 
Secretariat’s early-warning effectiveness will depend in many 
ways on the cooperation of member states. States must possess 
the political will to actively (1) provide warning-related 
information to the Secretariat on a regular basis, and (2) 
cooperate when the Secretariat requests information (e.g., fact­
finding mission).
The sub-thesis has outlined several ways in which the 
Secretariat can make such qualitative improvements in order to 
"act on warning" for the purpose of preventing conflict. In the 
body of the sub-thesis, however, three considerations have 
surfaced which question the success of such a capability. 
According to the first consideration, the institutional dynamics 
of warning are too complex for the Secretariat to provide 
warning of a threat to international peace and security. While 
there are many disputes in the world, only a small number of
crises evolve from these disputes and even fewer conflicts 
escalate from these crises. If Britain, which possessed both 
covert and overt warning capabilities in the lead-up to the 
Argentine invasion, could not issue a warning in the lead-up to 
the Falklands/Malvinas War, it is hardly likely that the 
Secretariat itself will be able to focus on one situation and 
sound a warning on that situation. Too many limitations exist 
beyond the Secretariat’s control, such as the neglect which the 
international media may show for long-term conflict situations, 
and the number of disputes with which the Organization may be 
seized at any time.
Following the second consideration, if member states are 
not themselves ready to actively provide warning-related 
information to the Secretariat, any renewed focus on warning 
will continue to lack political support. Despite the provisions 
of the Charter, member states opt for unilateral solutions over 
multilateral solutions. (jet when unilateral efforts to prevent 
hostilities fail, and conflict ensues, member states call the UN 
to resolve the conflict^
Most importantly, in line with the third consideration, 
while the Secretariat may be able to "act on warning" by 
assessing the likelihood of a potential conflict situation and 
issuing a private warning, there is no direct causation between 
the act of warning and the prevention of conflict. If the 
Organization had possessed warning in the lead-up to the 
Namibian crisis, for instance, it could not have actively 
prevented infiltrations by SWAPO along the 1000-mile Angolan- 
Namibian border. UN military forces in the crisis period are no 
substitute for UN diplomatic pressure in the pre-crisis period.
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Following these three considerations, the working 
assumption in the Secretariat is that conflicts are bound to 
occur with little warning. For all its renewed attention to the 
demands of warning, the UN cannot change certain "realities” 
such as a policymaker’s tendency to bolster an original 
assessment, to be "lulled to sleep" by the same pattern of 
activity in a long-term conflict situation, or to simply choose 
the wrong decision based on imperfect information. Accordingly, 
"warning" represents an opportunity for the Organization to 
create options for UN activity after a conflict breaks out, not 
before a conflict breaks out. "Worst-case" options for UN 
action must be identified in advance of the conflict, so the 
Secretary-General and/or the Security Council will not be 
uninformed, peripheral players if one or both parties in a 
dispute requests a UN role. With the Office for Research and 
the Collection of Information acting as a focal point, the 
Secretariat does its warning "homework", creates its options for 
UN action and remains ready to remove the conflict at the outset 
of open hostilities.
While acknowledging the complex institutional and political 
constraints which exist on the Organization, I have argued that 
the Secretariat can wield more deterrent capability if it (1) 
possesses the political will to act on the likelihood of a 
conflict situation, (2) acts on the basis of credible, 
verifiable information, and (3) acts along private channels of 
communication. While the Organization could never have 
militarily prevented the SWAPO infiltrations on 31 March 1989, 
for instance, it could have put authoritative pressure on SWAPO 
to not infiltrate at an early stage. In the final equation, the 
UN cannot get involved at such a late stage that active military
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force (e.g., via UN peacekeeping forces) becomes an option to 
attempt to prevent the conflict. Offers of mediation, 
"suggestions”, or arbitration must be in train long before the 
stage when either (1) member states to a dispute consider 
military means to settle the dispute, or (2) the Organization 
considers deploying a military force to prevent open 
hostilities.
To provide the optimal deterrent capability, the 
Organization must be able to issue a warning at an early stage, 
to bring attention to the states parties in a dispute that the 
Secretariat will be able to offer suggestions to normalize the 
dispute. The utility of the Secretary-General vis-a-vis other 
UN actors is the centerpiece of such a deterrent posture. In 
theory, the Secretary-General is a servant of the Security 
Council; in practice, however, the Secretary-General can often, 
via his "good offices", react more quickly and more effectively 
to an incipient conflict situation than the Council. As he 
gathers a good deal of information through his private 
consultations with foreign leaders (e.g., UN permanent 
representatives, foreign ministers, heads of state), the 
Secretary-General possesses quite useful private information 
which, combined with the public information available to ORCI, 
represents a formidable collection and assessment tool.
It is essential, however, to establish a high degree of 
credibility each time the Secretary-General opts to act on 
warning. The head of the Organization therefore must utilize 
information which correctly reflects the situation "on the 
ground." Verification proposals introduced in the sub-thesis 
include (a) intelligence cooperation between the UN and several 
"pro-UN" nations with "no strings attached"; (b) an
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institutionalized scheme whereby all member states routinely 
transmit warning-related information to the Office of the 
Secretary-General; (c) early use of fact-finding teams by the 
Organization, and (d) a UN-operated satellite- and airborne- 
reconnaissance capability.
It is also essential for the Secretary-General to use 
private means to act on warning. As pointed out in the sub­
thesis, the Secretary-General risks too much if he issues a 
public warning, particularly (1) political damage if the warning 
is a "hit” and the conflict ensues anyway, or (2) criticism for 
"crying wolf" if the warning is a "false alarm" and no conflict 
occurs. Privately, however, the Secretary-General can send 
notice to the parties that the UN is aware of the potential 
conflict without removing a role for himself. Such preventive 
actions by the Secretary-General (e.g., offer of "good offices" 
suggestions) provide a deterrent capability which cannot be
ignored.
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